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ABOUT THE REVIEW

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Serving as Editor in Chief for Report this semester has truly been a humbling experience. The hard work our cadet editors and undergraduate authors put in to ensure a quality issue was above and beyond what was originally asked of them. This journal would not be possible without their effort. Additionally I’d like to thank the staff and faculty of the History Department, especially Captain Matthew Cohen, for keeping us on the right path and guiding us to ever greater scholarship. Speaking for all the undergraduate historians who have worked on Report, it has been a truly invaluable educational experience.

This semester’s issue features a diverse selection of topics and themes. In our opening piece, Cadet Steven Brist examines the reforms of the Russian Imperial Army following the Russo-Japanese War. Next, Rachael Conger writes on the cultural portrayal of American nurses in the Philippines during World War II. Subsequently, Lydia Cornett studies the intersection of early feminism and decolonization in her article on the involvement of Maori women in the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement. This is followed by Patrick Gage’s revisionist argument on the Holodomor, the Ukrainian Terror Famine in Stalinist Russia. Next, we include Cadet Andrew Mengle’s paper on the transformation of American Indian activism in the early 1900s. Our closing article is a study of the post-war activities of Enver Pasha, the controversial Turkish general most tied to the Armenian Genocide, by Ben Tannenbaum.

Hopefully you will find as much enjoyment in reading our publication as we have had in writing it. Sapientia per historiam!

John McCormick
Editor-in-Chief, Report
West Point, NY
Lessons from the East: The Reforms of the Russian Imperial Army from 1905 to 1914

Steven Brist

Steven Brist is a cadet in his third year at the United States Military Academy studying Military History.

As the dust settled in Manchuria in 1905, Imperial Russia had suffered a tremendous defeat at the hands of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. Two things were clear: conflict was brewing in Europe and that in order to succeed in that conflict the Russian Imperial Army would need to cure the ailments that had caused defeat in Manchuria. In the midst of a social revolution that produced Russia’s first representative government and within one of the oldest and most deeply entrenched institutions in Russia, reformers attempted to fix the Imperial Army. From 1905-1914 the Russian Military focused on reforming doctrine to better suit the modern battlefield and reforming the General Staff of the Russian Army. However, the conflicting priorities and politics in the military and aristocracy led to these reforms failing to produce victory in World War I.

The major defeats of the Russo-Japanese War displayed the flaws in doctrine that existed within the Army. The execution of the Russo-Japanese War had been a disaster. As German observer Karl Von Donat noted, the Russians still relied heavily on the ideas of Mikhail Dragomirov which extolled the use of offensive tactics as the means to victory. As a result, Von Donat observed: “the Russian regulations expected success from obsolete shock tactics without sufficient use of skirmishes and without enough preparation by fire.” On a modern battlefield with modern weaponry, this type of doctrine would prove disastrous. Russian officers did not learn by trial and error and despite failure, it would be hard to break the officers’ reliance on Dragomirov. Throughout the conflict with Japan, General Aleksey Kuropatkin, the Russian commanding general, used a defensive strategy as he mistakenly believed his armies were vastly outnumbered and waited for mobilizing troops to move eastward. However, this defensive strategy, combined with Russian officers and soldiers being prepared only for the offensive, created chaos. In May of 1904, the Russian First Siberian Army Corps was defeated by the Japanese by the village of Vafangou. The Japanese proved their mastery of maneuver warfare as the Russians sat in the defensive and were eventually enveloped and forced to withdraw. The heart of the defeat laid both in the doctrine that put almost no emphasis on maneuver

2 John W. Steinberg, All the Tsar’s Men: Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010), 129-130.
Lessons from the East

warfare and a lack of Russian initiative. By August, the opposing armies were assembled for another fight at Liaoyang. Again, Kuropatkin chose to fight a defensive battle, holding a large portion of his army in reserve. The Russians were outmaneuvered again and forced to withdraw towards Mukden as Kuropatkin refused to commit his entire army.³ In February 1905, the Russians were again defeated in the titanic Battle of Mukden. Fighting defensively, Kuropatkin was outflanked and withdrew in much the same way as at Liaoyang.⁴ This string of defeats was caused by many things, not least among them Kuropatkin’s personal mistakes. However, in each instance the Russian Army’s inability to conduct maneuver warfare stood out as a deciding factor. This was caused both by a failure of leadership on Kuropatkin’s part and a lack of precedent in doctrine that would have allowed commanders to challenge the Japanese using enveloping movements. During the inter-war period, Russian reformers would use lessons from these defeats to try to redesign Russian military doctrine.

After the defeats in Manchuria, the leaders of the Russian military worked to reform the military doctrine within the Imperial Russian Army. Some of the first changes in doctrine recognized the importance of envelopment as the best means for offensive action.⁵ While still emphasizing the offensive, Russian military thinkers did away with Dragomirov’s outdated theories of frontal assault. During the inter-war years, two Russian military theorists came up with different plans for unified military doctrine. The first, N. P. Mikhnevich, outlined a strategy of defense with counter-offensive coming later, once Russia built up numerical superiority—essentially arguing for a war of attrition. The second was A. A. Neznamov, who argued for “launching rapid offensive operations, but only on the grounds of sound planning and operational linkages.”⁶ These two theories, in particular Neznamov’s, would become the basis for Russian war planning before 1914.

Central to the implementation of the new doctrine were the staff rides and war games that took place before the outbreak of greater European conflict. In the 1906 Kresnoe Selo maneuvers, the Russian Army attempted to put into practice many of the lessons they had learned fighting Japan. The demonstration was lackluster and poorly executed; both the assault and counterassault were both disasters. However, the generals were able to use the experience to make tangible improvements. In particular, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, commander in chief, would have a major role in reforms up until

³ Ibid., 136-137.
⁴ Ibid., 143-144.
⁶ Ibid., 229.
1914. War games between 1906 and the last maneuvers before the war focused on improving these tactical and operational failings. British and American observers witnessed real improvements in the infantry, while still seeing trouble with the emplacement and use of artillery. In 1914, war games were again held both in Kiev and around Helsinki and Saint Petersburg; the last before the outbreak of war. These maneuvers showed considerable progress in the operational reforms that had been focused on, but serious issues of command and control still existed. The improvements in the operational realm show a victory for the reformists within the Russian Army. Maneuver warfare and enveloping attacks had seemingly replaced the frontal assault and “parade field” mentality of the past. However, the defensive lessons learned in Manchuria were all but lost in the excitement of a reenergized offensive doctrine. Indeed, historian John Steinberg claims that as late as 1913 Russian officers were “…being trained to think offensively while in practice they acted defensively.” The very same disconnect caused disaster in the East under Kuropatkin. The lack of defensive doctrine may still have been the remnants of I. M. Dragomirov’s legacy, but it is also possible that untalented officers within the Imperial Army simply lacked the initiative and courage to execute offensively minded doctrine.

The Russo-Japanese War also demonstrated the ineffectual Russian officer corps and, in particular, how unprepared the officers of the General Staff were for war. Arguably the largest problem in command and control existed at the highest level of command in the theater. In order to take command of the armies in Manchuria, Kuropatkin had relinquished his post as War Minister. Arriving in theater, he then found himself technically subordinate to the Far Eastern viceroy, Admiral Y.I. Alekseev. The newly demoted Kuropatkin was by no means planning on taking orders and almost permanent conflict manifested itself when Alekseev demanded relief for the besieged Port Arthur and Kuropatkin delayed. The first major Russian defeat at the Battle of the Yalu was, in fact, a result of this command dispute. Each commander gave General M. I. Zasulich and his Eastern Detachment conflicting orders. Zasulich chose the orders he liked and marched towards Port Arthur, met the Japanese near the Yalu River, and was completely defeated. Even more troubling was the state of General Staff officers throughout the rest of the army. The German account of the war gives insight

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7 Steinberg, *All the Tsar’s Men*, 239-243.
8 Ibid., 253, 256.
9 Ibid., 268.
11 Steinberg, *All the Tsar’s Men*, 258.
12 Ibid., 123.
13 Ibid., 125-126.
into General Staff officers who had no ability to execute modern military operations; even just moving large numbers of troops was troublesome for some generals and staff officers.\textsuperscript{14} It is impossible to expect officers to be able to act independently or exercise initiative if they cannot even competently move their units from place to place. In most of the major battles of the war, officer initiative would indeed prove lacking. J. Taburno, a Russian war correspondent, reported on the same lack of initiative from corps commanders and lower officers since Kuropatkin himself was micromanaging their units. He described General Staff officers as lacking in the most practical experience of commanding an army, blaming them for the conduct of the war.\textsuperscript{15} The General Staff within an army was intended to fix many of the problems that plagued the Russians in Manchuria. Problems in supply, transportation, and command and control all showed failures of the staff officers charged with leading the different aspects of the army. Also troubling was the lack of individual initiative from almost every level of command. If the Russian Imperial Army was to survive, changes had to be made to correct the problems that plagued the Officer Corps in Manchuria.

After the performance of the Russian commanders during the Russo-Japanese War, reformers turned their attention on reforming the Russian Officer Corps and, specifically, the role of the General Staff. Tsar Nicholas II began the reforms in 1905 by creating two important organizations; the State Defense Council headed by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich and the Main Directorate of the General Staff. The State Defense Council was designated to be the commanding structure over both the army and navy, making the War Ministry nothing more than administrative in nature and attempting to prevent the type of conflict that arose between General Kuropatkin and Admiral Alekseev. The Main Directorate of the General Staff was simply a general staff at the highest level of the army, reporting directly to the tsar. The General Staff was to make the preparations for future war, including education and doctrine. With these organizations came a reform of the officer corps which retired 7,000 officers who were outdated or had failed in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{16} These measures were seen by reformers as improvements as they moved towards more modern military models and created a clearer command structure.

To address the pressing issue of the incompetency of the General Staff officers, reformers turned to the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff. In 1906, the Academy’s commandant was General N.P. Mikhnevich, one of the army’s foremost reformers. As commandant, he sent out a survey to graduates asking how well the academy had prepared them for the conflict in Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, the responses showed officers unprepared for

\textsuperscript{14} Von Donat, \textit{The Russo-Japanese War}, 64.
\textsuperscript{15} J. Taburno, \textit{The Truth Behind the War} (Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1905), 107-108.
\textsuperscript{16} Menning, “The Offensive Revisted”, 219-220.
leading modern armies. Col. A. A. Neznamov, the army’s other leading reformist, agreed that the curriculum of the Nicholas Academy needed updating. Mikhnevich aimed to reshape the curriculum to give officers both the practical skills needed to lead troops and the theoretical ability to respond and think in given situations. The Nicholas Academy was no longer to offer a secondary education, but instead specialized military knowledge. As will be discussed later, these reforms never came to full fruition. However, more practical education did become a part of curriculum. Reform of the General Staff was desperately needed, but only partially executed. The improvements that were made did have an impact on improving the state of the officer corps, without which the doctrinal reforms would have likely been for naught. In 1910, Sukhomlinov was appointed War Minister and put the General Staff back under his authority while also increasing training for reservists. By subordinating the General Staff to the War Ministry, Sukhomlinov decreased the independence and planning ability of the General Staff, making this, in part, a counter-reform. He did, however, succeed in increasing reserve forces right before the war. Coupled with the reduction of outdated officers in 1906, an increase in reservists should have provided Russia with a large and fairly well prepared officer corps by 1914. Reformists made large strides in improving the Russian officer corps; however, they were only partially successful. Many of the reforms that could have been did not survive the complex politics in both the military and the government. The politics of Tsar Nicholas II, the Duma, and the established military elite hindered many of the reforms of the interwar years. This hindrance had dire consequences when war came in 1914. There were many conflicts between these three groups and would-be reformers. The established military elite had little desire to accept the drastic changes being suggested by reformers and wanted to maintain the status quo that had existed since Dragomirov. General Mikhnevich was relieved as commandant of the Nicholas Academy by the Main Directorate of the General Staff. An investigation into the academy made by conservative leaders found that only minor changes needed to be made in the curriculum, not the extreme reform Mikhnevich had implemented. One of the most important needs of the army after Manchuria, a reformed General Staff, was prevented by the politics of the dysfunctional officer corps. The Duma saw the officers as the culprits of the

18 Ibid., 238.
19 Ibid., 240-241.
20 Menning, The Offensive Revisited, 221.
defeat of 1904-1905. By 1909, the first head of the General Staff had lost his job and the Grand Duke’s State Defense Council was dissolved due to pressure from the Duma. Many of the institutionalized changes that should have improved the command structure of the army, therefore, disappeared. The complex political situation counter-acted much of the progress that the reforms had made in the officer corps.

Also in debate was funding. The new war minister was only able to secure partial funds for the modernization of the artillery. In 1914, Russia had machine guns and light artillery but lacked in the heavy artillery needed for trench warfare. After Tsushima, the fate of the reconstruction of the Russian Navy was also a funding debate. The Duma, backed by the Imperial Army, wanted a smaller navy and smaller naval budget where Nicholas II desired costly battleships. The ultimate decision to spend millions of rubles on new dreadnoughts meant that resources, spent on ships that never saw action during World War I, could have been used in reforming the army. Although the reforms of the Russian military made huge strides to make the Imperial Army fit for the battlefield, the politics of the Russian military and government meant that those reforms never came to completion. The reform movement could only partially change the status quo, as both funding and policy support disappeared. Political problems in the military would continue into the war. The Grand Duke, appointed as commander in chief, was in conflict with both the war minister and the colorful Rasputin. In the summer of 1915, the tsar dismissed Grand Duke Nikolai and took over command of the army, completing the disastrous political overreach that had doomed army reforms.

The Russian performance in Manchuria at the Yalu, Vafangou, Liaoyang, and Mukden all proved that horrendous problems existed within the Russian Imperial Army. Chief among them was the lack of a unified military doctrine and a systematic problem in the performance of Russian officers. Reformists from 1905-1914 tried to correct these problems to varying degrees. A primary doctrine of envelopment and maneuver warfare developed and saw some success in war games up until 1914. Some strides were made in modernizing the officer corps and moderate reforms of the General Staff. However, neither of these programs could survive in the political environment of counter-reform and an autocrat adjusting to a constitutional government. As war loomed in Europe, the Russian government and military failed to properly fix its dysfunctional military. High prices would be paid at Tannenberg and in

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22 Steinberg, *All the Tsar’s Men*, 250.
23 Menning, “The Offensive Revisited,” 222.
26 Ibid., 161.
Galicia when the unready Russian army marched to war. Many problems caused the defeats and ultimate surrender of Russia in World War I, but few of them were so close within reach of being fixed by the government.
Angels of Mercy: A Gendered Analysis of American Nurses in the Philippines

Rachael Conger

Rachael Conger is a recent graduate of the University of Wisconsin at Madison. This paper is part of the research she conducted her senior year. She would like to thank Professor Mary Lou Roberts, who oversaw her research, as well as the excellent history program at her alma mater.

On July 1, 1942, in the gardens of the National Red Cross Headquarters in Washington, D.C., six Army nurses became the first American women decorated for bravery in the Second World War. Among the women was Juanita Redmond, a young woman from Swansea, South Carolina who had been one of the two dozen nurses evacuated from the Philippines before it was surrendered to the Japanese. Juanita was stationed in the Philippines from September 1940 to April 1942. Up until December 7, 1941, her time in the Philippines resembled a tropical vacation more so than military service as she nursed patients who treated tropical diseases during the day, golf in the evenings, and attended dinner and dances hosted by the officers’ club at night. After Pearl Harbor was bombed, things began changing quickly for Juanita. Her pristine hospital in Fort Stotsenburg became a jungle hospital with open air wards on Bataan. Although she continued treating tropical diseases, her main concern shifted to soldiers who required bandages, surgery, or amputation. She yearned for dinner at the officers’ club when her rations were reduced to two small meals a day, typically consisting of rice or caraboa stew. Fortunately for Juanita, she was evacuated from the Philippines and returned to America where she wrote a memoir recounting her experience and sternly reminding Americans of the thousands of soldiers, doctors, nurses, and corpsmen still held as Japanese prisoners of war.¹

Historians Elizabeth Norman, Evelyn Monahan, and Rosemary Neidel-Greenlee have written about nurses such as Juanita who served and became prisoners of war in the Philippines.² In particular, Norman and Sharon Eifried wrote about how those who were taken as prisoners of war managed to survive the three years they spent in the camps.³ However, historians have not examined the representations of these women in contemporary popular culture.

In 1943 two films were made based on the experiences of this group of Army and Navy nurses who served in the Philippines during the Japanese invasion. How do the actual experiences of these nurses compare to their representations found in popular culture? What does this comparison reveal about female gender roles during the Second World War? *Cry Havoc* and *So Proudly We Hail* heroized the nurses who had served on Bataan and Corregidor, but they also reflected prevalent cultural views of the time and as such the resulting story trivialized the experience and sacrifice of the nurses. An examination of these two films in relation to the experiences of the Army and Navy nurses depicted in them reveals a specific set of gender roles for women in the Second World War. First, although they were in the traditionally masculine settings, women were expected to maintain a feminine appearance. Second, the nurses were considered morale boosters for the men fighting the war. As subordinates in support positions and reminders of those they were protecting back home, the nurses presence at the front masculinized the men. Third, women at the front as well as at home were confronted by paradoxes requiring them to be tough but vulnerable, as well as permissive, yet virtuous.

**Army and Navy Nurses in the Philippines: Reality and Representation**

Accounts like those of Redmond take place against a backdrop of military nursing whose history extends to the beginning of the twentieth century. Beginning in 1901 and 1908, women began serving as civilian nurses under military contract in the Army Nurse Corps and Navy Nurse Corps. Because they were originally civilians and not members of the military, they had few benefits and no ranking. However, they were the first group of women officially recognized as a part of the military. Army and Navy nurses received relative ranking to men in 1920 and 1942. All nurses were given the rank of officer so in the event of capture they received better treatment. Of the 70,000 women in the Army and Navy nurse corps, 31,000 served overseas in the European, African, and Pacific theatres of war. Nurses who chose to serve overseas marked the first movement of American women toward battlefront.

Many of the nurses who served in the Pacific theatre were unexpectedly hurled into a warzone when the U.S. military fought one of the most brutal battles of the war in the Philippines. After the initial Japanese attack, U.S. forces and all nurses retreated to the Bataan Peninsula and the island of Corregidor on Christmas Eve 1941. Everyday life in the jungle, only miles from the front, was very different from anything the nurses had previously experienced. They bathed in nearby streams, ate two meals a day,

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4 Norman, *We Band of Angels*, 129.
6 Norman, *We Band of Angels*, 52.
7 Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee, *All This Hell*, 2.
8 Yellin, *Our Mothers’ War*, 186.
Angels of Mercy, 15

and lived under constant fear of illness and bombardment. Malaria was a serious problem for the men and women on Bataan. Men with malaria came into the field hospitals at a rate of 1000 per day. The doctors and nurses took preventative doses of quinine, but as the supplies decreased they too contacted the disease. Additionally, as a result of unsanitary conditions, nearly everyone on Bataan suffered from dysentery. The effects of malaria and dysentery were aggravated by the growing problem of malnutrition. The nurses’ lives were not only threatened by illness, but also bombardment by Japanese planes. This was the harsh backdrop against which nurses like Redmond recorded their experiences, and filmmakers later sought to propagandize.

In fact, the nurses of the Philippines had a prominent role in the American wartime imagination. Seen as recruiting posters come to life by the U.S. government, eighteen of the nurses toured the country recruiting more nurses and selling war bonds. Eager to help the war effort, Hollywood was quick to produce two 1943 films featuring women and war that doubled as home front propaganda: Cry Havoc and So Proudly We Hail. Directed by Richard Thorpe, Cry Havoc was considered topical due to Bataan’s frequent appearance in the news, but it was profitable nonetheless. So Proudly We Hail, directed by Mark Sandrich, was considered a more realistic depiction of the nurses’ experiences on Bataan and was well received. The New York Times’ Bosley Crowther reviewed both films; interestingly, he focused his criticisms on the women in the films. He thought Cry Havoc was a picture “like ‘So Proudly We Hail’… which is heavy with theatricality and the affectations of an all-girl cast.” Of So Proudly We Hail he said, “[U]nfortunately Mr. Sandrich has not been able to parallel the reality of the setting with that of his characters…Walter Abel, as an Army chaplain, in one brief speech is truer than any of the girls.” These reviews bring up several interesting points regarding women in film, more specifically the representations of women in traditionally masculine settings—in this case the role of the nurses in field hospitals during the battles of Bataan and Corregidor.

**Keeping Up Appearances**

Although his reviews heavily critiqued the realism of the two films, Crowther fails to mention the unfeasibility of the nurses’ well-maintained

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9 Norman, *We Band of Angels*, 36.
10 Ibid., 51.
11 Ibid., 122.
12 Ibid., 127.
appearances throughout the films. This suggests that the level of femininity maintained by the characters in the film was considered reasonable, further implying that Army and Navy nurses were expected to keep up their feminine appearance despite the fact that they were working in a traditionally masculine setting. Contrary to the truth, *Cry Havoc* and *So Proudly We Hail* greatly exaggerate the nurses’ abilities to maintain their feminine appearance by dressing the actresses in fitted coveralls, including tight belts that accentuate their small waists.\(^{15}\) In a diary entry on February 16, about two months into their stay on Bataan, Ruth Straub wrote, “We nurses look very strange in our air corps dungarees. Mine are size 42. All of us have long hair now. We part it and tie it in two braids, fastening the braids with the flannel we found around the hospital.”\(^{16}\) In contrast to Ruth’s diary entry, the nurses in both films wear expertly applied makeup and their hair is curled and pinned up, even though the nurses did not resume the “off the collar” regulations for their hair until they were relocated from Bataan to Corregidor.\(^{17}\) In *They Were Expendable*, director John Ford dramatizes the role of American patrol torpedo boats in the defense of the Philippines. The story focuses on two male patrol torpedo boat captains, one of whom enters into a romantic relationship with Sandy Davyss, a Navy nurse on Bataan. In this particular scene, Sandy attends a dinner party with six of the patrol torpedo boat crewmen, but before it’s she is introduced to these men she steps in front of a mirror, brushes her curly locks of brown hair, puts on a string of pearls, and adjusts the kerchief standing in for a pocket square of her Army issued coveralls.\(^{18}\) This scene demonstrates the absurd expectations placed on the nurses to maintain their femininity in the warzone on Bataan. Thus, examining a single entry from Ruth’s diary reveals the effort made by these three films to represent the Army and Navy nurses as more feminine than their real life counterparts, creating an expectation for these women to maintain their femininity even in a setting as harsh and traditionally masculine as the battlefield in the Philippines.

Though to some extent, it seems as if the nurses on Bataan and Corregidor internalized this expectation of feminine maintenance. A passage from Juanita Redmond’s memoir reads,

“A problem peculiar to the feminine personnel was keeping up appearances—our appearance. It’s an axiom that a woman’s morale goes up or down according to the way she looks, or thinks she looks. At Limay we had been lucky enough to have a Filipino civilian do our laundry...at Little Baguio we put aside such frivolities. We worked in

\(^{15}\) *So Proudly We Hail*, directed by Mark Sandrich (1943; Agoura: Paramount Pictures, 2007), DVD; *Cry Havoc*, directed by Richard Thorpe (1943; Culver City: MGM, 2010), DVD.

\(^{16}\) Ruth Straub, quoted in Norman, *We Band of Angels*, 57.

\(^{17}\) Norman, *We Band of Angels*, 98.

\(^{18}\) *They Were Expendable*, directed by John Ford (1945; Culver City: MGM, 2007), DVD.
coveralls, which were ugly and much too big for us, but very practical; our white shoes were white by courtesy only; what was left of our cosmetics was hoarded like a miser’s gold, to be used only on the rare occasions when we ‘went to a party.”’

Although there is a hint of obligation in her comment about keeping her shoes white “by courtesy only,” this excerpt demonstrates that the nurses continued to be concerned over fashion and beauty even on the edge of the battlefield. Considering the media women were confronted with during the war, this internalization of such expectations regarding their femininity is not surprising. By 1940 mass media had tied cosmetic beauty ever more closely to notions of feminine identity and self-fulfillment. Media created during the war praised women who managed to maintain their femininity while doing a man’s work. Therefore, *Cry Havoc* and *So Proudly We Hail* simply reinforced the cultural norm of the war which expected women to keep their femininity regardless of their movement into traditionally masculine settings.

In addition to maintaining a feminine appearance, another stark contrast between the appearance of the real life nurses and their representations in film was the incredible weight loss they experienced. As a result of disease and the minimal rations on Bataan, one nurse was so malnourished that she weighed seventy pounds when she was evacuated from Corregidor. The films failed to include the weight loss suffered by the nurses. However, this inaccuracy speaks more of government censorship than societal expectations for women. The War Department gave Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and Paramount Studios permission to make films about the nurses on Bataan and Corregidor. It follows then that the U.S. government preferred Americans not to be confronted by the harsh conditions faced by their loved ones serving overseas because it would likely cause public unrest and a general lack of confidence in the American military. This government censorship of *Cry Havoc* and *So Proudly We Hail* calls into question other governmental motivations during the war, specifically in regard to their conceptualization of the role of women in American society. An example of government involvement in the shaping of the female wartime image is that of Rosie the Riveter. The original Rosie illustration by Norman Rockwell depicted a rugged and stout female war worker holding a hearty sandwich in her strong hands, her battered rivet gun resting across her lap. By dissecting this image of Rosie, the motivations behind the government’s decision to commission a new rendering become clear: with her beefy frame, large appetite, and the

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21 Norman, *We Band of Angels*, 108.
22 Ibid., 128.
23 Yellin, *Our Mothers’ War*, 43.
phallic quality of her rivet gun, Rockwell’s Rosie was far too masculine for the cultural norms of the time. Thus was born the government’s softer, better known depiction of Rosie accompanied by the words “We Can Do It!” This image of Rosie typifies the ideal wartime woman promoted by not only the government, but also popular culture—including films such as Cry Havoc and So Proudly We Hail. She is feminine with her plucked eyebrows, full makeup, and curly hair, but ready to assume her position in a man’s job as she flexes her toned yet slight arm, pulling her sleeve back with a slender hand complete with polished fingernails.

**Subordinates as Morale Boosters**

One reason the nurses strove to maintain their femininity in the field hospitals was in an effort to heighten the morale of the men fighting. Women were considered very effective morale boosters for the troops. For example, in a memoir composed after the war, one of the surgeons on Bataan spoke of the morale boosting effect the nurses had on the soldiers,

“One of the most remarkable things to come out of our experience in Bataan was the presence and performance of the army nurses. In retrospect I believe that they were the greatest morale boost present in that unhappy little area of jungle called Bataan...Some of the men in the combat area who had a moment of quietness would steal away to the hospital to spend a short while in the company of a woman.”

Knowing they had this important effect on the men, the nurses were happy to oblige any time they were invited to dine or dance with the soldiers on Bataan and Corregidor. For example, Juanita Redmond and Eunice Hatchitt were invited to dinner by a group of officers, after which the officers provided entertainment with formal typewritten programs. All of the nurses also had a standing invitation to dinner aboard a gunboat anchored near the hospital. In her memoir, Juanita describes one of these dinners she attended, “Inez MacDonald and I went one day and were almost overcome by nostalgia at the sight of the silver and table linen. They gave us wonderful food and lots of cigarettes, and after dinner we played bridge with Captain Pohlman ad Lieutenant Erickson. It was fun and relaxing.”

They Were Expendable features a similar scene in which the nurse Sandy attends a dinner party with six PT boat crewmen. She sits at the head of the table where all six men can easily gaze upon the oddity of a woman in their midst. Sandy’s presence at dinner allows the men to reminisce about pleasant times before the war. Both the real life and on-screen nurses act as normalizers that remind the men what

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24 Ibid., 44.
25 John Bumgarner, quoted in Norman, We Band of Angels, 63.
26 Redmond, I Served on Bataan, 76.
27 Ibid., 79.
they are fighting for: the simplicity of prewar times and the protection of the women they love on the home front.28 Thus, the nurses on Bataan and Corregidor stood in for all American women by bringing the sentiment and love of the women back home to the men in combat,29 effectively boosting their morale.

Women as morale boosters can also be seen through their stoicism, especially when interacting with men in combat. For example, in her memoir from 1943, Juanita does not express any concern over the absolute devastation the men were facing in the Philippines. She only speaks of their bravery and perseverance, as in the following passage about the injured men who came into her care after the first round of bombings by the Japanese in December 1941, “The boys were so quiet. They didn’t scream or cry out. They clenched their teeth and fought the pain…I’ll never forget my first amputation.” She then recalls the conversation in which the doctor informs a soldier that his leg required amputation, to which the soldier replied, “Well, do a good job on it, Doc.’ And he grinned. But they were all like that.”30 Knowing that it would be read by many Americans, Juanita likely maintained a stoic demeanor throughout her memoir so as to preserve the morale of all Americans, but especially the men in the military. This stoicism is also prevalent in Cry Havoc and So Proudly We Hail when the senior nurses scold younger nurses for crying or visibly worrying in view of the wounded or ill men in their field hospitals. The nurses in the films only express pity or concern for the soldiers when they are in their private quarters or bathing—two locations far out of the men’s earshot. But once again, because these media reached many Americans, a character’s reminder of the bravery and strength of the soldiers resolved any concerns expressed in these scenes. It is of course true that an ideal military nurse would maintain a high degree of stoicism under stressful conditions, but by hiding their pity and concerns, the women reaffirm their confidence in the soldiers, perhaps suggesting that they are relying on the men to protect them. Thus, in positioning themselves as the protected and subsequently subordinate to the men in combat, the nurses boost troop morale by implying that the men are responsible for their lives and the lives of those on the home front as well.

A similar stoicism is also expressed by women on the home front in their interactions with their loved ones serving in the military. When writing to their husbands and sons overseas, women expressed joy and optimism regardless of how they truly felt.31 Women on the home front struggled with many issues they had never faced before such as rationing, managing finances, housekeeping, and caring for their children. Women were frequently confronted with a combination of these challenges while also working for the

28 Peiss, Hope in a Jar, 239.
29 Yellin, Our Mothers’ War, 77.
30 Redmond, I Served on Bataan, 23.
31 Yellin, Our Mothers’ War, 22.
first time in their lives. However, women were reluctant to complain about home front conditions—perhaps as a result of the advice they found in women’s magazines encouraging them to keep correspondence with soldiers upbeat and cheerful. In this way, women on the home front contributed to heightening troop morale. Though, this once again illustrates their subordination to men in that their needs for emotional support are met second to the men’s. Juanita’s memoir, the representations of nurses in the three films mentioned above, and letters from women on the home front demonstrate the extent to which women were thought of as morale boosters, though often from a position subordinate to the soldiers.

**Paradoxes: Tough and Vulnerable, Permissive and Virtuous**

As their role in society was adapted for wartime needs, women were characterized by paradoxes, especially those who transitioned into masculine environments. Although women had to be vulnerable in order to boost the morale of the soldiers, they were at the same time expected to also be tough because many of them had been thrust into masculine settings in response to the war. For example, *So Proudly We Hail* portrays the nurses as tough enough to survive in a warzone, but vulnerable enough that their male companions were reminded of the nurses need for protection in their masculine world. Lt. Janet “Davey” Davidson, for instance, is initially very independent and rejects the advances made by her love interest, Lt. John Summers. But once they reach Bataan and the nurses realize how dangerous the warzone is, Davey professes her love for John. This implies Davey’s need for John’s protection, both emotional and physical. However, for the real life nurses, these roles of protector and protected seemed to be reversed. Take Juanita Redmond’s recollection of the second bombing at one of the hospitals as an example,

> “Sergeant May had pulled me under a desk, but the desk was blown into the air, he and I with it. I heard myself gasping. My eyes were being gouged out of their sockets, my whole body was swollen and torn apart by the violent pressure. This is the end I thought. Then I fell back to the floor, the desk landing on top of me and bouncing around drunkenly. Sergeant May knocked it away from me, and gasping for breath, bruised and aching, sick from swallowing the smoke of the explosive, I dragged myself to my feet...We worked wildly to get to the men who might be buried, still alive, under the mass of wreckage, tearing apart the smashed beds to reach the wounded and the dead. These men were our patients and our responsibility”

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From this passage, it seems that the nurses thought their patients rather than themselves vulnerable, as they quickly brushed off bombings to see that the men under their care were alive and well. This implies that the nurses’ work did not allow them to take on the paradox of tough and vulnerable perpetuated by their representations in *So Proudly We Hail*.

However, this paradox is clearly seen by women’s transitions into and out of war work. Many women gained a sense of strength and independence by working in war plants. However, by the end of the war, these women were pushed out of the workforce to make room for the men returning from war. Consequently, women on the home front were expected to step into male roles, but relinquish their newfound confidence and return to work in the home, once again becoming dependent on men as they returned home from the war. Although it is refuted by Juanita’s account, the paradoxical expectation for women to be both tough and vulnerable as they entered masculine environments is clearly demonstrated by the popular and economic cultures of the war.

Another paradox faced by women during wartime was the expectation that they be permissive, but ultimately virtuous. This paradox began developing in the interwar period when the boundaries of permissive sexual activities for American youth began to widen. The war then brought unprecedented opportunities for premarital experience as a result of relaxed social constraints which developed out of the shifting wartime society as women entered the workforce and men joined the military. During the war, permissive young women known as victory girls caught the attention of many as society tried to contain their sexual behavior, but not the behavior of the men they associated with. This double standard separated women into two groups: those who were permissive and not respectable and those who were virtuous and respectable. From these developments came men’s desires for “sexy mates,” who were still expected to uphold the traditional standards of virtue. As such, women were characterized by this permissive but virtuous paradox throughout the war.

As an example of this paradox, consider Dorothea Daley Engel’s experience as it relates to that of Davey’s from *So Proudly We Hail*. Dorothea was one of the twenty-three army nurses evacuated from Corregidor after serving on Bataan. Before the war broke out, Dorothea met her husband.

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34 Yellin, *Our Mothers’ War*, 71.
35 Ibid., 68.
37 Ibid., 260.
38 Ibid., 261.
39 Ibid., 263.
40 Ibid., 265.
Emanuel at an officers’ club dance at Clark Field.\textsuperscript{41} They were soon engaged, but when all of the nurses were relocated to Bataan the two were separated.\textsuperscript{42} Reunited at Hospital #1 after a couple of weeks, they were married a month later on February 19.\textsuperscript{43} However, when Dorothea was evacuated her husband’s whereabouts were unknown and he was declared missing in action by the Army.\textsuperscript{44} Similarly, Davey met Lt. Summers before the war and the two were married in a field hospital. Also like Dorothea, Davey’s husband was declared missing in action as she was evacuated from Corregidor. Unlike Dorothea though, the film hinted at a sexual relationship between Davey and John before they had married. The two are seen embracing in a foxhole before the screen fades to black; when the lights come back up, Davey awakes alone in the foxhole to find that John left her a note in which he excuses himself for not saying goodbye, but he did not want to wake her. Given the similarities between these two stories and the fact that Dorothea’s was published a year before \textit{So Proudly We Hail} premiered, it seems likely that the latter was based on the former. However, unlike the historical account, the film suggests permissiveness on the part of the Davey (Dorothea) character. In this way, a paradox is created between the virtue of the real life nurse and the permissiveness of her on-screen representation.

Another manifestation of this paradox can be found in virtuous women who put up a permissive façade. Pat, a nurse from \textit{Cry Havoc}, is an example of a promiscuous character who is often flirting with a male officer, Lt. Holt. Pat frequently rebels against her commanding officer and the head nurse, Mary Smith, who Pat notices is also attracted to Holt. The two become jealous of each other as they witness one another exiting Holt’s quarters, and like the audience, are unaware of what occurred behind closed doors. Initially, the film gives the impression that Pat and Smith are promiscuous women. However, when Holt dies later in the film, it is revealed that he and Smith were married. With this new information, Smith is no longer considered promiscuous, but rather a virtuous woman who occasionally spent the night with her husband. Additionally, when Pat finds out that the two were married she makes it clear that nothing came of her flirtations with Holt, and had she known of the marriage she never would have interfered with their relationship in the first place. Thus, Pat’s virtue is also revealed by the end of the film. \textit{Cry Havoc} creates two characters initially perceived as permissive, but as the film develops, the virtue of both characters is uncovered, consequently reinforcing the paradox.

In addition to \textit{Cry Havoc} and \textit{So Proudly We Hail}, the paradoxical expectation for women to be both permissive and virtuous can be seen in a

\textsuperscript{41}Dorothea Daley Engel, “I Was Married in Battle: An American Army Nurse’s Own Heartbreaking Story of Her Honeymoon in Hell,” \textit{American Magazine}, 1942, 27.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 112.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 115.
variety of popular culture from the war. Many other Hollywood films projected provocative images of women in stories of seduction. At the same time as seeing these provocative images, women were also confronted by a reinvigorated purity movement which battled against the public display of sexuality. Every step toward sexual liberation was met by an equal and opposite effort to maintain traditional standards of decency. As a result, women found themselves surrounded by two opposing ideals for their role in society. Pinups also provide evidence of this societal paradox facing women during the war. Drawn by Alberto Vargas and featured in Esquire, the Varga Girls were a particularly controversial set of pinups found on the walls of many male barracks during the war. The Varga Girls’ many states of undress and suggestive poses resulted in a lawsuit against Esquire by the United States Post Office. Esquire won the case, claiming that the magazine’s content boosted the spirits of American soldiers. However, the Post Office’s attempt to censor the racy content demonstrates the changing attitudes regarding women and sexuality during the war. Esquire suggested women be flirtatious and provocative while the Post Office expected they remain respectable and wholesome, thus setting these oppositional roles as those that American women should aspire to. Another woman who appeared in popular publications was Lace, a 1943 cartoon. She was “sexy but still wholesome, risqué in dress or undress, while still somewhat innocent in spirit.” In this cartoon, the main female character is literally defined by the paradox—sexy but wholesome, risqué but innocent; Lace further advances this paradox for women during the war. These examples, including Cry Havoc and So Proudly We Hail, demonstrate the extent to which men and women were confronted by popular culture that perpetuated this paradoxical role for wartime women, expecting them to be permissive, yet at the same time virtuous.

Conclusion
Comparing the representations of Army and Navy nurses in Cry Havoc and So Proudly We Hail to the experiences of the real life nurses on Bataan and Corregidor has proven a useful case study in identifying the gender roles that confronted American women during the Second World War. Women were expected to remain feminine throughout the war, even though many found themselves working in masculine environments. Their subordinate role in society further masculinized the soldiers, making them effective morale boosters. Additionally, women faced a culture of paradoxes including expectations that they be tough but vulnerable and permissive yet virtuous. These roles come together to demonstrate society’s reaction to the way in

45 D’Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 279.
46 Ibid., 280.
47 Yellin, Our Mothers’ War, 96.
48 Ibid., 103.
which women were beginning to reposition themselves within it. The national emergency brought on by the war unsettled conventional ideas about women’s capabilities and their place in society.49 As female positions in society began to reflect those of their male counterparts, efforts were made to slow women’s social mobility—thus arose this set of female gender roles. For example, women’s presence in traditionally masculine settings such as war plants or field hospitals was countered by an expectation that they maintain a prewar ideal of femininity. These same women were asked to give up their newfound independence for their prewar positions in the home and reliance on their husbands for financial stability. Their prewar subordination to men was maintained in their wartime positions in the workforce or the military. Additionally, as women’s sexuality came to reflect men’s sexual behavior, Christian organizations and politicians worked to preserve prewar standards of decency.50 Therefore, it seems that wartime roles for women were meant to combat their social mobility and allow for a return to prewar society upon the war’s end.

Postwar American society initially reflected the effort to preserve prewar female gender roles, but later their wartime liberations expanded as women established themselves as more than housewives. Women in the first several postwar years moved to the suburbs and found themselves once again as homemakers. They traded in their coveralls and rivet guns for aprons and spatulas, becoming the ideal image of femininity, subordinate to men, and dependent on their husband’s income.51 What little sexual liberation they may have achieved during the war was quickly subverted by purity movements as they reacted to the female promiscuity of wartime.52 However, in the later postwar years, women’s social mobility began to gain momentum once again as women established themselves as a permanent presence in the workforce and resumed their pursuit of sexual liberation. For women then, wartime society was a confrontation between traditional prewar roles and the beginnings of female liberation.

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Inadvertent Suffrage: Maori Women and the New Zealand Women’s Christian Temperance Union

Lydia Cornett

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In his *Nations and States*, the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote: “I am driven to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition’ of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists.”¹ This paradox of “the nation” certainly exists for the country of New Zealand, whose history as a settler society nation is often embedded within an imperial framework. By the late nineteenth century, New Zealand was officially a self-governing colony, yet not considered equal in status or given a place in the League of Nations until the 1920s. James Belich defines New Zealand in the nineteenth century as a “recolonial” nation—technically independent of Britain, yet culturally still a colony.² In this paper, I will investigate a particular historical moment which illustrates the local intersection of imperial and transnational forces: the role of indigenous Maori women in the New Zealand’s women’s suffrage movement of the late nineteenth century. First, New Zealand’s indigenous-settler relations during this time period were noticeably distinct from—and influenced by—those of Australia. The suffrage movement itself was spearheaded by the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which was modeled after the founding organization in the United States. Finally, the entire governmental and political process of the suffrage movement existed under the eyes of the British Empire. The Australian scholar Patricia Grimshaw assesses this simultaneously trans-national, bicultural, and imperial phenomenon of race, temperance, and representation, concluding that Maori women’s inclusion in New Zealand’s equal suffrage bill was practically inconsequential. My aim is to add the literature of Women’s Christian Temperance Union to the story, which I see as a valuable component to understanding this historical juncture. I will begin by examining the theme of New Zealand nationalism and outlining several components of the historical narrative: the women’s suffrage movement, Maori rights and representation, and indigenous forms of government. From here, I will examine the intersection of Maori women and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union,

focusing on the portrayal of Maori women in both meeting notes and the union’s primary publication, *The White Ribbon*.

**New Zealand’s Suffrage Movement**

According to Peter Gibbons, most historians in the early twentieth century emphasized New Zealand’s colonial origins and British ties. Later scholars, however, “preferred to think of New Zealand and New Zealanders in the twentieth century as transcending their British origins, outgrowing their colonial beginnings, not just aspiring to but achieving national identity and independence.” In this way later New Zealand historiography often designates “the nation” as its primary narrative. In her introduction to *The New Oxford History of New Zealand*, Giselle Byrnes condemns this tendency of progressive and evolutionary history writing. She argues that this approach is often celebratory and triumphant, and “national identity” is a way for historians to minimize British imperial influences.

The emergence of the women’s suffrage movement is one of many events in New Zealand’s history that reflects this triumphant and self-congratulatory rhetoric. Kate Sheppard, a leader in the fight for women’s suffrage, is honored on the New Zealand ten-dollar bill, and various memorials are scattered across the country that honor the movement. On September 19, 1893, Governor Lord Glasgow passed the Electoral Bill, which was the first piece of legislation to grant all women the right to vote. This right was granted to both Maori (the indigenous Polynesian population of New Zealand) and Pakeha women (of European descent) alike. In most scholarly literature on the women’s suffrage movement, this inclusion of Maori women is mentioned as another indicator of New Zealand’s progressive evolution. However, there are certain reasons why Maori women were included, and even more complexities in the racial and sexual divides that affected Maori women’s participation. By looking at the literature published by the New Zealand Women’s Christian Temperance Union—the organization that spearheaded the women’s suffrage movement—I shall argue that the W.C.T.U. was interested in advocating for Maori women only in terms of social and moral purification, rather than political empowerment and equal status. Despite their history of involvement with the W.C.T.U., Maori members were consistently placed in a different category than W.C.T.U. women of European descent.

For the most part, the origins of the women’s suffrage movement lay in the hands of a single organization—the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which was the only national organization for women at the time. Founded in 1886, the W.C.T.U.’s ideology was derived from its parent

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4 Ibid.
organization in the United States.6 Indeed, Mary Clement Leavitt, an American missionary, had arrived in New Zealand in 1885. She toured the country for several months, preaching that “the home is woman’s kingdom” and urging women to “attack their natural enemy, alcohol.” While Leavitt’s primary undertaking was the abolition of alcohol, in her campaigning she stressed the common issues women faced and the ways they could tackle them by working together. New Zealand audiences were extremely receptive to Leavitt’s ideology, and the first national convention for the New Zealand W.C.T.U. was held the following year in 1886. The New Zealand branch had a similar mission as the American organization—to promote temperance, Christian values, and social reform through the abolition of alcohol. All women who joined the W.C.T.U. took a short pledge to “solemnly promise, God helping me, to abstain from all intoxicating liquors, including wine, beer, and cider, and to employ all proper means to discourage the use of, and traffic in the same.”7

There are varying theories for the origins of the W.C.T.U.’s franchise campaign. Most historians agree that the women of the W.C.T.U. wanted a say in the moral stability of their country and needed the vote to legitimize these demands. According to Charlotte MacDonald, “the evangelical roots of temperance stressed the link between the spiritual transformation of the individual and the moral transformation of society.”8 Other scholars, such as Raewyn Dalziel, argue that New Zealand women’s work had more economic significance, and women truly wanted a more elevated, political role in society as a consequence.9 Richard Evans chooses to contextualize the achievement in terms of New Zealand’s weak political structure.10

Regardless of motive, the demand for suffrage came early. Kate Sheppard spearheaded the movement within the W.C.T.U., publishing pamphlets such as Ten Reasons Why the Women of New Zealand Should Vote in 1888, collecting signatures for parliamentary petitions (from both Pakeha and Maori women), and starting branches in Wellington, Dunedin, and Christchurch. The Liberal government of New Zealand was divided on the issue of women’s franchise. While certain politicians were known to be sympathetic to the W.C.T.U.’s cause, some members of parliament supported the liquor industry, and others opposed the idea of women in politics. In 1891

7 New Zealand Women’s Christian Temperance Union, Meeting Minutes, September 1, 1886.
8 MacDonald, 33.
and 1892, the Lower House passed electoral bills that would have enfranchised all women of New Zealand, but they were sabotaged by members of the more conservative upper house, the Legislative Council. Regardless of such opposition, on September 8, 1893, the bill was passed by twenty to eighteen, and it was signed into law by Lord Glasgow on September 19.

It is worth noting that with the passage of this law, all Maori women were also given the right to vote. Most accounts reference this event with a pleasant anecdote, as with Dorothy Page’s *The Suffragists: Women Who Worked for the Vote* of 1993, which stated that: “When it was asked in the House of Representatives whether voting rights should be extended to Maori women, there was a roar of unanimous approval.”¹¹ This simplifies a much larger story. The general attitude towards Maori women was not one of amiability—in fact, when the bill was first passed in the Lower House two years earlier, newspapers expressed their disapproval at the unanticipated Maori provision:

> *It surely was never expected that Maori women would be put on a footing with their European sisters... In view of the time—which is not far distant—when there will be no political distinction between the races, it is certainly a mistake to give Maori women even a prospect of a seat in Parliament.*¹²

The writer’s reassurance that Maori and Pakeha people would someday be equal in political agency reflects a typical colonialist attitude—eventually, equality would prevail, but only at some undefined moment of the future. Additionally, it is worth noting that Maori women were involved in two suffrage movements at the same time. They sought the right to vote as both members of the New Zealand Parliament House of Representatives and members of Te Kotahitanga, the Maori Parliament. However, they were similarly rejected by male members of their own community; Tania Rei states that no member of Maori parliament was particularly eager to vouch for Maori women’s suffrage.¹³ Finally, when it came to the passage of the 1893 Electoral bill, Maori women’s enfranchisement would not have much influence within the parliament system. To examine these complexities, it is important to understand a brief background of Maori-Pakeha relations, as well as Maori male and female political involvement.

**Indigenous Rights and Representation**

Within New Zealand’s nationalist historical narrative, indigenous-settler relations are often favorably compared to those of Australia. According to Patricia Grimshaw, the Maori were never under the strict control of a settler

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regime like the Aborigines of Australia. Grimshaw cites two main reasons for this claim: the Maori people’s relatively peaceful adoption of Christianity and their capacity for military defense. Christian missionaries had arrived in New Zealand long before the British takeover, so Maori adoption of Christianity during the colonial period was under less forceful circumstances than the Aborigines’. In 1840, Maori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi, which to the British meant that Maori had yielded all power in exchange for the protection of their lands and resources. Many chiefs, however, were aware of the British occupation of the Australian Aborigines, and they demanded privileges that were similar or equal to those of the Europeans.

When settler land acquisition and misappropriation became a noticeable burden to the Maori people, who lived and worked in a land-based, horticulturalist society, they used military force and warfare to assert control. For decades, Maori tribal groups had been politically and militarily organized and had experimented with European weapons. Grimshaw notes that settlers were “frankly fearful of violent retaliation from Maori for many decades,” particularly during the 1860s Land Wars. As a result, British settlers had to decide how to cooperate with the Maori people, specifically in terms of political involvement and voting rights. According to Julie Evans, “Maori were too suspicious and warlike to be placed under a settler minority or to be debarred from the franchise.” The British governor of New Zealand feared that if Maori men were excluded from voting, their discontent might lead to further hostilities. Yet because the Maori population was so substantial (despite increasing mortality rates as a result of European diseases), they had the potential to influence the outcome of an election. This was an even more frightening idea to the British governor since it theoretically could harm the “supremacy of white interests in the legislature.” The resulting compromise was the Maori Representation Act of 1867, in which Maori men were allocated four seats—three in the North Island, and one in the South Island—in the House of Representatives. Adult Maori males over the age of twenty-one were eligible to vote for these four seats. Although a relatively weak amount of political representation, compromising measures such as this act were what distinguished New Zealand indigenous-settler history from Australia’s. Grimshaw concludes that the Maori had a few more rights and

17 Evans, Grimshaw, Phillip, and Swain, 74.
18 Grimshaw, *Settler Regimes*, 562.
privileges than the Aborigines, who were forced to endure colonial influence for much longer.\textsuperscript{19} New Zealand officials, on the other hand, could not understand how Maori people could be unhappy with their position. The British Governor Browne told Maori chiefs in 1857, “New Zealand is the only Colony where the Aborigines have been treated with unvarying kindness.”\textsuperscript{20}

When it came to suffrage for women of New Zealand, then, the disparate settler histories of New Zealand and Australia played a major role. Grimshaw writes:

\textit{In New Zealand, settler fears of men of color had led to the incorporation of Maori men into the mainstream political system; hence, Maori women could readily be incorporated as well when the women's vote was on the agenda. Settler fears of men of color in Australia, however, led to their exclusion from mainstream politics at the very time that women's suffrage was on the national agenda.}\textsuperscript{21}

While all women could vote in New Zealand by 1893, Australia’s Commonwealth Franchise Act was not passed until 1902, which granted female suffrage to white women only. Maori women’s enfranchisement therefore soon became another celebratory achievement in New Zealand’s progressive and nationalist narrative. In 1919, the \textit{Taranaki Daily News} reported a women’s suffrage event held at Carnegie Hall in New York.\textsuperscript{22} Emmeline Pankhurst, a leading British suffragette, brought three Maori women to the event and showcased them as an example of New Zealand’s modern advances. She states: “If the native women of New Zealand are considered good enough to have a vote, then I say it is time the white women of England are emancipated and allowed the same privilege.”

Grimshaw, however, implies that the inclusion of Maori women in the electoral bill of 1893 may have been more than a coincidence than other historical accounts, such as the above article, recognize. She writes:

\textit{When the Parliaments of 1890 to 1893, therefore, considered the women's vote, there was little or no question of excluding Maori women. The electoral settlement had occurred twenty-five years earlier. Maori women's political rights could be accommodated by their allocation to the same four Maori electorates. Universal women's enfranchisement in 1893 thus did not unsettle the system previously designed to protect settlers from potential renewed Maori military aggression and Maori political power.}

Because the enfranchisement of Maori women did not “unsettle the system,” or provide an opportunity for Maori members of parliament to gain more agency, their inclusion was not as groundbreaking as it appeared. Most

\begin{footnotes}
\item[20] Quoted in Evans, Grimshaw, Phillip, and Swain, 79.
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members of parliament who did support equal suffrage still made a distinction between Maori and Pakeha women. In August of 1893, cabinet member Charles H. Mills pointed out that “while the great advance made by women might entitle them to a voice at the polling booth, their Maori sisters had made no such progress in education.” While Maori women were not “entitled” to the vote like Pakeha women, they were not excluded from it since their inclusion would have no consequence on their people’s representation in parliament.

Maori Women and the W.C.T.U.

Women in New Zealand—Maori and Pakeha alike—faced a variety of societal burdens during the late nineteenth century. In many women’s lives, alcohol abuse was connected to many social and economic problems. The formation of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, therefore, was of interest to Maori women, who began joining the organization in the late 1880s. Upon joining, Maori women were required to give up a sacred part of Maori culture: they signed a pledge that prohibited their practice of tā moko, or the tradition of bodily tattoos which symbolized rank. In the following section, I will examine the intricacies of the relationship between W.C.T.U. and Maori women, specifically focusing on how the W.T.C.U. viewed Maori women’s political and suffrage rights.

In most scholarly literature about the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, mentions of Maori women involvement are quite brief. Bronwyn Dalley and Yvonne Robertson state that the Union did “extend its concern over the use of alcohol to Maori women,” and even established a few temperance groups. However, Dalley and Roberson add that the W.C.T.U. was not very active in Maori communities until 1894, when a special Maori Department was created. The details of this department are not specified. In terms of Maori involvement in the W.C.T.U.’s suffrage movement, Dorothy Page includes but one sentence, noting that: “Maori women are not recorded as having played a major role in the activities of the W.C.T.U. or the franchise leagues, and the issue of their enfranchisement had not been pressed by Maori members.” Did Maori women not “play a major role,” or did the W.C.T.U. not allow them to have one? Was the relationship between Maori women and the W.C.T.U. a beneficial one, or perhaps only beneficial in certain contexts? A later comment by Page certainly raises these questions: “the union was disturbed at evidence of alcohol abuse among Maori and placed great emphasis on proselytizing Maori women.” The W.C.T.U.’s “great emphasis”

24 Ibid., 40.
26 Page, The Suffragists, 39.
on correcting the Maori community’s social problems through the values of Christianity is certainly part of the reason that these scholars mention little of Maori women and political empowerment.

Patricia Grimshaw writes that the W.C.T.U. adopted an international humanitarian mission of including women of different ethnicities. She cites Jessie Ackerman’s (leader of the Australian W.C.T.U.) proclamation at the organization’s second national convention in Sydney in 1894: “Our banner floats in forty-seven lands, and in forty-seven languages can we read our motto ‘For God and Home and Every Land’.” Yet when it came to indigenous women’s political rights, the W.C.T.U. evaluated these women in a different category—by “the steps they had made in ‘progress’ toward Western educational, religious, and cultural norms.” In other words, if the women of New Zealand’s W.C.T.U. wanted to improve Maori women’s social conditions, they did so by means of Peter Gibbons’ term “cultural colonization”: they attempted to improve them to British settler standards. In the passage below, Grimshaw eloquently links this idea with the reasons why Maori women inadvertently won the right to vote:

*When [suffrage activists in the white societies of New Zealand] presented their case for women's entry into political rights, they eschewed the racism of many fellow colonists. These women were nevertheless part of a privileged social group who colluded in the creation of an historical narrative that presented colonization in a positive light. It was a version of history that had justified, and continued to justify, differential treatment of indigenous peoples. When the suffragists' cause reached the platforms of those holding political power, politicians made decisions based on not just the supposed outcomes on gender relations but on the vote's implications for the colonial project as a whole. They manipulated women's civil rights in ways that would diminish indigenous people's impact on settlers' political dominance. Thus New Zealand legislators in 1893 were prepared to admit Maori women as well as white women to the vote because Maori women's influence would be contained within preexisting Maori-only electorate.*

In the remainder of my paper, I will test Patricia Grimshaw’s above argument in the context of the W.T.C.U.’s annual meeting minutes as well as *The White Ribbon*, the organization’s primary publication from 1895 to 1960. Focusing on the years from 1885 to 1900, I will examine the W.C.T.U.’s view of Maori women, locating examples of indigenous patronization, Western

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28 Grimshaw, *Settler Anxieties*, 566.
idealism, and evangelical “uplifting” that limited these women’s opportunities for empowerment and political engagement.

Most references to Maori women in W.C.T.U. publications before 1893 (the year of the passage of the franchise bill) are found in the Union’s annual meeting notes. While regional branches held more frequent meetings, the meetings from these notes were held annually in one of the major W.C.T.U. hubs—Auckland, Wellington, Dunedin, Christchurch, or Invercargill. In the first meeting in Christchurch on February 23rd, 1886, Maori women are reported in the context of temperance efforts:

*Good work has been done among the Maoris. Miss Williams has charge of a school for Maori girls, and is doing good work among them. Amongst the Maoris themselves there are active workers in the Temperance cause, and Temperance meetings have been held by the Natives in several villages in this district. Paora Ropiha, of Waipawa, has worked zealously in Hawke’s Bay, as well as in other parts of the North Island, and has induced a large number of the Maoris to take the pledge and don the Blue Ribbon.*

Here it is apparent that the W.T.C.U. was actively attempting to recruit Maori members. While having more members certainly helped the organization to grow, Maori members could also help to create what Grimshaw defines as the W.T.C.U.’s “heritage of humanitarianism.” These recruitment efforts continued for the next several years. In the notes from the meeting on February 22nd, 1888 in Dunedin, a “Reverend Mr. Rowse, of Waimate” is thanked for translating a pamphlet titled “Twentieth Century Women” to Maori, “for distribution amongst intelligent Maori women.”

Of course, Maori outreach was simply one part of an extensive agenda for the Union. Other topics of these meetings included debate over the use of unfermented wine at the Communion table, enforcement of Bible-reading in schools, and the Union’s future claim to fame: the franchise movement. For the next few years, the franchise movement became the Union’s objective, and most meetings dealt with parliamentary petitions and connections with politicians rather than Maori work. Members of the W.T.C.U. did, however, ask for Maori signatures on petitions from 1892 and 1893 for evidence of significant numbers of women wanting to vote. After the passage of the Electoral Bill in September of 1893, the organization could refocus their efforts on the original missions of temperance and social purity. In her address to the Ninth Annual Meeting in Invercargill on February 27th, 1894, President Annie Schnackenberg states:

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31 Grimshaw, *Settler Anxieties*, 566.
32 New Zealand W.C.T.U. Annual Minutes, February 22nd 1888
33 Tina Rei, 9.
Now that the Electoral Bill, giving women the right to vote, has passed, we are in a position to ask for such measures as shall, in our opinion, tend to raise the moral standards of the country. Reform must begin with the youngest members of this young nation, and, entering our schools, teach righteousness and temperance.34

Maori people, in addition to the younger generation, were also subject to this moral purification. Examples of this intention are present in writing of the W.T.C.U.’s primary publication, The White Ribbon, founded in 1895.

Before the W.C.T.U. raised enough funds to publish their own journal, they would contribute articles to The Prohibitionist, a publication primarily read by men.35 The first issue of the White Ribbon in May 1895 (two years after the passage of the enfranchisement bill) signified the W.C.T.U.’s total independence and designated an emphasis on women’s interests. These interests took the form of articles on the latest ideas in health, childcare, divorcee rights, nutrition, dress, ex-prisoner’s rights, and equality within the marriage. The White Ribbon was published monthly for several decades until it changed to the present quarterly publication called The White Ribbon Digest.

In the first White Ribbon issue from May 1895, an article titled “Report of Work Among Maoris” informs readers about the distribution of pledge cards and the circulation of a pamphlet called “Health for the Maori,” which had “been met with great enthusiasm.”36 Local branches of the Union were encouraged to start Maori outreach committees. In the November issue six months later, one of these local branches reported:

This department of W.C.T.U. work has been started and carried on by the superintendent, Mrs Duff Hewett, whose attention to the Maoris was first attracted by a circumstance which was the result of wearing the blue ribbon. The little bow of blue attracted and aroused the indignation of some tipsy Maoris. The ringleader pointed at Mrs Hewet, making grimaces, and saying “No good the blue ribbon;” and instead of retiring from this formidable person, Mrs Hewett returned the compliment by pointing at him, and said, “No good the Waipero (alcohol);” and then, advancing towards him, she touched his arm and said “If you take too much Waipero you go down there (pointing downwards); you will never see the beautiful heaven and a beautiful Christ (pointing upwards). You will go down down to be with Issou (Satan).” He looked surprised (as also did the others) at being talked to in this way, and said “I want the blue ribbon now!” Mrs Hewett said “You must come come and talk to me at my house, and he went the following Sunday, and signed the pledge.”37

34 The President’s Address” to the Ninth Annual Meeting in Invercargill on February 27th, 1894
35 Grimshaw, Women’s Suffrage, 38.
Here, the W.T.C.U.’s “Maori work” has more to do with spreading Christian values to the Maori people rather than working specifically to recruit Maori women members. The language surrounding this incident categorizes the Maori as simple-minded and childlike. Mrs. Hewitt is depicted as an all-knowing savior who rids the Maori chief of the evil of alcohol while preaching the principles of Christianity. The chief signing the pledge is representative of the Maori “uplifted.” In summation, this anecdote serves as a form of socio-cultural colonization portrayed in a positive light by a settler society—something that Grimshaw points to as the creation of a colonialist/nationalist historical narrative.

Articles in *The White Ribbon* certainly reinforced the categorization of the Maori as an inferior people, deserving of special or differential treatment. In the same issue, a Maori chief named Te Heu Heu spoke at the Taupo branch’s WCTU meeting on June 3rd, 1896. The following passage recounts the WCTU members’ reactions:

*The dignity of the speaker impressed all, and the politeness and refinement of the interpreter, Mr Hone Heke, M.H.R., charmed everyone. Te Heu spoke earnestly as to the evils of waipero amongst the Maoris. He called it “that great monster,” devouring alike both Pakeha and Maori. He most courteously thanked the W.T.C.U. and Mrs Hewett for taking up the work, and said he would do all he could to promote the cause amongst his people, and invited Mrs Hewett to visit them at Taupo. At the close of the meeting Mrs Hewett said funds would be required for the printing in Maori of pledge cards and temperance tracts, also New Testaments and other books for distribution...The first lady to come forward with a subscription was Mrs H.D. Bell; and amongst others who have kindly contributed is our Governor’s wife, the Countess of Glasgow, who has expressed in the kindest terms her sympathy with this department of W.T.C.U. work.*

The Maori speaker here is deemed as respectable and earnest because of his apparently uncharacteristic manners and easy compliance with the temperance cause. Additionally, members of the Union are made to feel virtuous and empathetic by their donations to the Maori work effort. While the above passage is from a section entitled “Temperance Work Among the Maoris,” it ends by praising various W.C.T.U. members. Finally, later in this passage, Mrs. Duff Hewett, the Superintendent of Work Among Maoris, explains that “this work not only stirs up activity to the more educated of the Maoris, but gives a helping hand to those who see the evils of taking alcohol but who are not strong enough to step on to the side of temperance alone.”

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38 Ibid, 7.
39 Ibid.
words, only certain Maori people were viewed as educated enough to understand the merits of temperance and Christianity. Clearly Mrs. Hewett saw herself as integral to the elevation of the Maori people, particularly “those...not strong enough to step on the side of temperance alone.”

One ironic aspect of the W.C.T.U.’s temperance work with Maori people was the continuous positive presentation of colonization despite the origins of alcoholism in Maori communities. In the June 1896 issue of the White Ribbon, Lady Glasgow stated in a meeting at Waipu that “No one denies that the Maoris have gained much good by the advent of the white men, but, alas! in some way they have brought you much harm; the habit of drinking too much being the worst lesson you have learned from them.”40 Ironically, European settlers introduced alcohol to Maori communities, and it was not attained by significant numbers of Maori until the 1850s.41 Lady Glasgow continues with the following explanation:

*It is the hope of all of us who are your real friends that, now you know the terrible evil it brings upon you, weakening both souls and bodies, you will join together and by God’s grace get rid of this evil out of your families and tribes, becoming again in the future what you have been in the past, both physically and mentally, one of the greatest races that flourish in the Empire of Queen Victoria.*42

By distancing themselves from their colonial male counterparts, perhaps the women of the W.C.T.U. attempted to expound the virtues of temperance in a way that did not come with historically negative connotations. However, their similar objectives are cloaked by “God’s grace.” The promise of the Maori “becoming...one of the greatest races that flourish in the Empire” is questionable from the perspective of a privileged social group like the W.C.T.U.

By September 1896, five Maori branch unions of the W.T.C.U. had been formed.43 The areas of work for these unions were all issues of temperance, Christian morality, or societal development: “temperance, social purity, Sunday-school, Band of Hope, sewing-class, and Bible class.”44 In this same issue of the White Ribbon is an article, presumably for white women, entitled “Suggested Questions For Candidates at the coming Elections.”45 As women had been eligible to vote for the past three elections, this article guides them in how to assess a candidate: “Will you vote for the removal of all civil and political disabilities from women? Will you vote for the equality of

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40 “Temperance Work Among the Maoris,” The White Ribbon vol. 1 no. 12, June 1896, 5.
42 “Temperance Work Among the Maoris,” 5.
43 “Among the Maoris,” The White Ribbon vol. 2 no. 15, September 1896, 3-4.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
conditions of divorce, making them the same for women as for men? Will you support the principle and practice of equal wages for equal work?” With so much focus on sobriety and evangelism, one might overlook the fact that the W.C.T.U. was equally dedicated to informing women of their civil rights and political role in society. Yet looking at the content in these questions (all European rather than Maori issues) and the arrangement of the *White Ribbon* (all things Maori-related were in Maori-titled articles), it appears that these articles on political agency were not designated for Maori women. Even with seemingly new independence in the five new Maori branch unions, Maori members were consistently placed on a lower scale than their Pakeha counterparts. This differential treatment is further emphasized in a final article from the same issue. The writer urges the women of the W.C.T.U. to consider the fate of Armenian women during the 1896 Hamidian massacres:

> I beg to speak to you on behalf of the most desolate and unhappy women on earth—the women of Armenia...As Britons, as citizens, as Christians, do you agree to preserve peace and conserve moneyed interests by letting continue the age-long martyrdom of Armenia? Is your idea of the sisterhood of women bounded by distance, by sect, by race? If not, it is your duty to protest at once through every branch of your great organisation.\(^{47}\)

The irony of this passage is that readers are urged to commiserate with the circumstances of a fellow group of women simultaneously patronizing another. Here, Christianity is the conscience behind protesting for equality, yet in Maori communities, it was a force of colonization.

In subsequent years, Maori women were able to establish more independence within the W.C.T.U., and the view of the Maori seemed to be shifting. By 1908, a Maori Congress within the Union had been formed. This article from the August 1908 issue of the *White Ribbon* provides a new window onto Maori empowerment:

> The Maori Congress which recently met in Wellington was an epoch-marking event. Never perhaps since the Treaty of Waitangi has Maori history produced anything of such deep import and so far-reaching in its probable results. The Young Maori Party, who arranged the Congress, have very evidently the welfare of their race at heart, and they ought to have the hearty sympathies of the Pakehas in their efforts to raise their people in the scale of civilisation.\(^{48}\)

The Young Maori Party was not a political party, but a Maori improvement organization established by educated and westernized Maori students of Te

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Aute College in 1897. Over the course of the twentieth century, the party was admired and supported by many Pakeha activist groups who saw their programs as advancing the Maori race. By the 1970s, a new generation of Maori activists viewed the Young Maori Party as a “sell-out” association who subscribed to the myth of European cultural superiority. In 1908, however, the “welfare of the race” and the motive of helping the Maori’s “scale of civilization” were new ideas for the women of the W.T.C.U. The report from the White Ribbon also includes acknowledgement of settler imperialism and a call for action:

*The capable and popular secretary of the Congress (Mr Ngata)...read the petition drawn up by Congress, to be presented to parliament that night, urging for further legislation to protect the Maoris from the curse which the white man had introduced to them...In one of his many tactful, persuasive little speeches, made a pathetic appeal, urging the Pakeha no longer to look on the Maoris from the tourists’ standpoint as curiosities, but to take them seriously as brothers and sisters who are striving to rise from the lethargy and degradation into which many of them have fallen. The Congress must have excellent results, but these results will be all the more certain and widespread if we, as the white women of New Zealand, do our duty towards our less fortunate sisters.*

Mr. Ngata’s appeals being reported in a way that demonized “the white man” was quite a radical movement for the White Ribbon. It certainly is nothing like previous accounts, which constantly praise the efforts and goodwill of settler women behind the temperance movement. Additionally, by this year (1908), this Maori Congress was working with the New Zealand Parliament. Twenty years before, this had been a goal of Te Kotahitanga, the Maori Parliament. Maori political involvement within the W.C.T.U. was rising.

However, the focus in Maori work never completely shifted from its original focus on temperance, morality, and piety. In the subsequent issue of the White Ribbon issue in September 1908, an article titled “Our Maori Sisters” urges Union members to return to Christianity as the basis of Maori involvement:

*What can we do to help them? What is it our duty to do? ...Christ died for them to save and redeem them as well as the rest of the world. The time is opportune to seek to educate them and to interest them in all important matters connected with Christianity, and the sanctity of home life and parenthood. They are anxious and willing to learn better ways of living and of bringing up their children...One of the ways in which we can do this is to establish Unions amongst*


50 Ibid.
Rather than their portrayal in the previous article as an empowered people, the Maori here are once again depicted as helpless and vulnerable, desperately in need of Christian teaching. The writer believes they need instruction in domestic issues instead of political empowerment. As Maori work and organization continued to grow with the establishment of more Union branches, Sunday schools, and youth parties, the White Ribbon’s attitude constantly fluctuated between its traditional view of social purity and a more egalitarian mentality. For example, in a May 1909 article about a new Maori mission in the North Island, the W.C.T.U. writer Frances Barton described the Maori as “strong, able men and women” who “long for a chance in life to prove that they are capable of success in agricultural and other pursuits.” Yet in the same article, she characterizes the people as reliant on settler assistance:

A young Maori girl, upon returning a book entitled ‘Bible Wonders,’ remarked: ‘Mother made me read it to her twice, and she said if the Pakeha has books like that to read, no wonder she can pray.’ We might well reverse it and say if the Maori has no Bible to read no wonder she cannot pray.

Finally, in March 1912, another restricting measure was introduced for the Maori. In certain districts, polls were given to Maori residents about the passage of a law that would make the distribution of liquor to Maori people unlawful. According the White Ribbon, with this law, it would “not be permissible for anyone to entertain a Native, with alcohol, even in his own private house. Not even will the housemaid be allowed to hand a glass of liquor to a Native in a proclaimed Maori District the Natives inhabiting which have carried the prohibitive proposal.” Even more concerning is the way this bill had already been enforced. When it was enacted in the Horouta district in December of the previous year, it had been protested by a petition signed by fifty Maori people. Yet after this petition was dismissed by three magistrates, the White Ribbon declared:

Henceforth, until the proclamation is revoked, no liquor can be supplied to Natives throughout the whole of that wide domain. The Natives have done their part, and the Magistrates theirs. It only now remains for those in authority to see that the law is effectively enforced.

53 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
Despite the encouraging developments in articles before, this enforcement of temperance in authoritarian rather than spiritual way was an even more extreme form of imperial force by the W.C.T.U. After almost twenty years since Maori women were granted the right to vote, it is evident that the W.C.T.U. had much progress to make in terms of viewing Maori women as a self-sufficient group, capable of moral, political, and spiritual decision-making.

While analyzing the patronizing rhetoric of a temperance union’s publication might seem quite microscopic, this resolutely local story is a small thread in a larger trans-national narrative. Temperance, an international fascination, was a way for women to have political agency in a local setting. Yet as a settler privilege, it was essentially reserved for European women. At the beginning of this paper, I located Maori women’s status within the New Zealand women’s suffrage movement as an intersection of various forces: race, temperance, and political representation in a local, national, and imperial context. The White Ribbon is an example of a local publication whose literature was influenced by larger trans-national and trans-imperial forces of Western idealism and cultural colonization. These influences, in turn, affected the attitude towards Maori women during the women’s suffrage movement, thus making their inclusion in the 1893 Electoral Bill inconsequential and practically “inadvertent.” Today, the New Zealand women’s suffrage movement remains a celebrated yet multifaceted historical event. National celebrations that honor historic moments such as Waitangi Day and ANZAC Day contain similar issues. Waitangi Day, which commemorates the signing of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi by British officers and Maori chiefs, is frequently protested by Maori activists, while ANZAC Day is criticized for its implied Britannic race patriotism. The complexities of these commemorative national holidays reflect the country’s continued struggle to maintain a delicate balance of biculturalism, post-colonialism, and nationhood.
The Holodomor as Genocide

Patrick Gage

Patrick Gage is a junior studying International History at Georgetown University. He would like to acknowledge the International History department, his professors, and his parents for their support.

The Holodomor caused millions of starvation-related deaths in communist Ukraine from 1932 to 1933 and constituted one of the Soviet Union’s worst famines. Yet after decades of debate its status as an act of genocide remains a bitter point of contention: while scholars like Robert Conquest blame Russian authorities for deliberately creating artificial grain shortages to exterminate the Ukrainian population, others fault agricultural mismanagement and industrial expansion instead. Per the International Criminal Court, which defines genocide as a crime “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” the latter position seems more accurate.¹ Although Stalin intentionally exacerbated Ukraine’s lack of food to ensure its people suffered, his goal was not their physical destruction, but rather the promotion of Soviet industrialization. Considering the Holodomor a genocide therefore ignores the essence of such an act as determined by international law.

Ukraine’s road to famine began in 1928 with the introduction of Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan, a dramatic economic program that aimed to transform bucolic Russia into a major industrial power. The “breakneck speed” at which Moscow attempted to modernize proved problematic, however, as millions of new workers moved to booming cities such as Magnitogorsk.² Annual urban migration increased from 1.1 million people in 1926-1929 to 3 million in 1930-1932.³ The regime already faced chronic food shortages as a result of Lenin’s pseudo-capitalist New Economic Policy (NEP), which encouraged Soviet farmers to “[keep] grain for their own consumption…and [instead] sell the government industrial crops or cattle for which compensation was higher.”⁴ Thus by the late 1920s, communist officials had instituted rationing policies in many urban areas.⁵

The Kremlin’s rapid investment in hard industry – steel, coal, machinery – only compounded the problem. While the number of non-

¹ “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Court, accessed November 26, 2015, 3. In 1998 the ICC essentially committed itself to prosecuting all potential cases of future or past genocide, a right frequently recognized by the United Nations Security Council. For that reason the court’s definition of the crime, which mirrors the United Nations’, is proper to use in this context.
⁴ Ibid.
agricultural workers in Russia soared, the amount of food available to feed them did not. In response Stalin turned to collectivization, a brutal, involuntary process by which landed peasants, who lived primarily in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and the Kuban, merged their property with neighboring plots to form vast, quota-controlled collective farms overseen by party activists. Consistent with Bolshevik ideology, Moscow believed nationalizing the U.S.S.R.’s arable land and organizing it into larger, more easily controlled tracts would increase efficiency, decrease prices, and lead to higher rates of production, finally supplying enough food to support the empire’s burgeoning cities. Stalin also hoped to finance Russia’s industrial expansion by exporting surplus grain at a profit.

Moscow’s first attack on Ukraine came in 1929 with the repression of its so-called ‘bourgeois farmers,’ or kulaks, who constituted five percent of the peasantry; in reality the term was used to describe “any peasant opposed to collectivisation and de-kulakisation.” 6 Blaming them for Russia’s grain shortages, communist agents deported or shot hundreds of thousands before the end of 1931.7 The campaign proved catastrophic: “In this way, a large part of Ukraine’s most industrious and efficient farmers ceased to exist.”8

As ‘dekulakization’ reached a fever pitch in early 1930, so too did collectivization. Naturally the Ukrainian peasantry violently opposed abolishing private property. Party officials who entered villages and demanded farmers pool their land, tools, and cattle met harsh rebuke; some were even killed. Knowing they would eventually lose, many peasants chose to destroy or squander their possessions rather than hand them over; between 1928 and 1932, Ukrainian farmers killed more than fifty percent of their livestock and intentionally sold surplus grain at a “great loss.”9 Nevertheless collectivization continued, and by March 1930 “about 3.2 million peasant households in Ukraine had surrendered to the invaders of their villages and…entered the collective farms to await their fate.”10 Although Stalin eased the process that same month, allowing many displaced families to take up private farming once again, his officials made operating a small stead nearly impossible. Thus in

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6 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 409; per Subtelny, Soviet kulaks were in fact very poor by modern standards, with few exceeding US$800 in total net worth (inflation-adjusted based on dollar value in 2000); Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 93.
8 Subtelny, Ukraine, 410.
10 Subtelny, Ukraine, 411.
1932 collectives “accounted for [roughly] 70% of [Ukrainian] farming households.”

Collectivization had a disastrous effect on Soviet agriculture. Bolshevik officials, many lacking prior experience, often ordered “the planting of inappropriate crops” and failed to provide farmers sufficient technical support; tractor production, for example, proved inadequate and crude, leaving collectives without suitable replacements for Ukraine’s slaughtered draught animals. Compounding the problem, grain from peasant-owned, government-controlled farms (kolkhozy), along with that collected from state-owned radhospy, frequently spoiled long before shipping due to Ukraine’s sub-par transportation system. Plagued by drought, the region struggled to produce foodstuffs. In 1931, “almost one-third of the grain yield was lost during the harvest,” and twelve months later “the total area sown in Ukraine contracted by a fifth.” Yet Stalin ignored calls to ease procurement and kept quotas high, despite pleas for leniency from local leaders.

The Great Famine was no foregone conclusion in Ukraine. For all of the Bolsheviks’ mistakes, grain yields in 1932 were not so low as to necessarily leave the entire region starving. That said, the harvest was indeed significantly smaller than in past years, posing an enormous threat to Soviet food supplies. Widespread hunger became inevitable.

Near the end of his first Five-Year Plan, Stalin refused to let paltry yields and a recalcitrant Ukrainian population slow Russian industry. In August 1932 he authorized officials to seize grain from peasants and arrest or kill anyone caught stealing; by the end of 1933, officials had sentenced 125,000 Soviet farmers and executed 5,400. Bolshevik agents subsequently began “shipping out all the food from entire districts.” In November, Moscow barred Ukrainians from keeping any grain for themselves until their quotas had been filled. Those who failed to meet Stalin’s demands were “required to pay a special tax in meat,” particularly devastating to families who had thus far relied on homemade, milk-based products to survive. In early January 1933, Ukraine saw her internal and external borders sealed in an attempt to keep farmers from moving to better nourished regions; in just one month’s time, the police forcibly returned 190,000 aspiring migrants to their crumbling villages. Soviet Ukraine now “resembled a giant starvation camp.”

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11 Ibid., 412.
12 Ibid., 412-413.
13 Ibid., 413.
14 Ibid., 414.
15 Pipes, *Communism*, 60.
16 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 45.
After months of ruthless requisitions, the Great Famine took hold. At the beginning of 1933, a five-person Ukrainian peasant family was expected to survive the year on roughly 80 kilograms of grain, or 1.7 kilograms per person per month. Rats, garbage, and even human flesh replaced bread at the table. The situation can only be described as hellish: “The most terrifying sights were the little children with skeleton limbs dangling from balloon-like abdomens. Starvation wiped every trace of youth from their faces, turning them into tortured gargoyles.” In the face of rising death tolls, Moscow rejected foreign aid. Approximately 2.6 million Ukrainians perished as a result of negligence and deliberate action on Stalin’s behalf; total demographic losses equaled 4.6 million by 1939.

The Soviet government cannot be blamed for creating a poor harvest in 1932. While communist policies precipitated Ukraine’s catastrophic decrease in planted arable land and 16-20 percent reduction in yields compared to 1928, they did not do so intentionally. The goal was always more grain, not less, and as a matter of utility, officials hoped to avoid mass starvation; they needed as many experienced farmers as possible, especially after dekulakization. Nevertheless, Stalin can and should be held responsible for the tragic events that followed. But did he commit genocide?

The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines genocide as any situation in which a regime deliberately attacks a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with a view toward that group’s total or partial physical destruction. If the Holodomor was genocide against the Ukrainian people, then, Stalin must have intentionally targeted ethnic/national Ukrainians for total or partial destruction. Thus two questions emerge: Was the Great Famine intentional and ethnically/nationally focused, and if so, what was its goal?

Intentionality has always posed a problem for historians; proving what someone did is far easier than demonstrating why he did it. Holodomor scholarship suffers the same shortcomings. On the one hand, academics bitterly dispute the Great Famine’s causes. In contrast to Orest Subtelny, who claims “food was available,” R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft conclude Ukraine and the rest of southern and southeastern Russia produced a mere 58.1 million tons of grain in 1932, 10 million tons less than

19 Subtelny, Ukraine, 414.
20 Ibid., 414-415.
The Holodomor as Genocide

contemporary reports suggest. In our opinion,” they write, “the 1932 harvest was 16-20 per cent smaller than the 1928 harvests…. The 1932 harvest was thus lower than that in the drought year 1931…. The occurrence of two bad harvests in succession greatly added to the difficulties of the authorities in distributing grain.” Davies and Wheatcroft fault Soviet mismanagement and natural phenomena like drought, rather than deliberate Bolshevik policy, for prompting such dramatic declines.

Yet even if Stalin did not manufacture the Soviet Union’s dangerous food shortages, he intentionally made the problem in Ukraine worse. Reduced grain supplies meant all, or at least part of the U.S.S.R would go hungry to some extent. Moscow could have distributed that hunger evenly among the empire’s independent republics, but instead Stalin held firm on Ukrainian grain quotas. In fact, Premier Vyacheslav Molotov, then one of his “two main associates in the field of agriculture,” increased procurement in November 1932. Agents also began seizing other food products, like sugar, beets, potatoes, and lard. “The government,” writes David Marples, “was creating the conditions for the complete physical destruction of the rural population, including women and children.”

But whether Stalin specifically targeted Ukrainians remains in dispute. Davies and Wheatcroft accurately point out that all southern Soviet regions, including non-Ukrainian Kazakhstan, suffered immensely. Yale historian Timothy Snyder counters: “Famine had struck parts of Soviet Russia as well as much of Soviet Ukraine in 1932. Nevertheless, the policy response to Ukraine was special, and lethal. Seven crucial policies were applied only, or mainly, in Soviet Ukraine in late 1932 or early 1933.” Orest Subtelny also identifies Ukraine as Stalin’s primary victim, due to its size and relative importance. The region’s catastrophic losses during the collectivization and famine periods, which far outstripped those of its neighbors, make the latter position more likely.

Stalin’s emphasis on Ukraine does not prove he singled out a specific ethnic or national population; the republic was by no means homogenous. Yet contextual realities like the rise of Ukrainian nationalism, which had threatened Soviet unity for years, and Ukraine’s seemingly friendly relationship with Poland, a longtime Russian enemy, lend credence to the theory that Moscow attacked a people who jeopardized the U.S.S.R.’s territorial integrity, rather than a province. Stalin’s December 1932 mandate calling for the “correct implementation of Ukrainization” and removal of

24 Ibid.
25 Marples, Heroes and Villains, 41-42.
26 Ibid., 42.
27 Snyder, Bloodlands, 42.
“bourgeois [Ukrainian] nationalists from party and Soviet organizations” indicates just such an ethno-national focus. Unfortunately, making a conclusive claim on the subject is difficult, considering how many other communities suffered, particularly Germans and Poles. That said, Ukraine’s uniquely painful experience, combined with Stalin’s apparent interest in crushing Ukrainian national sentiment and well-known distaste for Russia’s rural neighbors, implies Moscow subjected the region to particularly egregious starvation conditions for reasons other than its great size. Its objective in doing so, however, derails the Holodomor’s claim to “genocide.”

While millions of Ukrainian peasants starved in 1932 and 1933, their deaths do not appear to have been Stalin’s goal. In a desperate attempt to continue feeding Russia’s urban workforce and financing industrialization, the Kremlin instituted a policy of requisition at all costs. Its principal aim was not to kill Ukrainians. Instead, it intended first and foremost to save the Soviet Union’s industrial proletariat at the expense of conveniently anti-communist farmers. This last question invalidates the Holodomor’s claim to genocide. While history indicates intentionality and an ethno-national focus, Stalin attacked Ukrainians not to destroy them, but to fund Soviet industrialization. Ukraine’s Great Famine therefore fails to meet the last criteria for genocide set forth in the 1998 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court and thus cannot be considered as such.

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28 Marples, Heroes and Villains, 42.
The Red Progressives: Native Americans and the Shift from Assimilation to Pluralism

Andrew Mengle

Andrew Mengle is a history major at the United States Military Academy who wrote this essay for the course "Making of Modern America" with Professor Samuel Watson. Upon graduation he will serve as a Field Artillery Officer with the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany.

One great irony of American history has been the exclusion of the earliest Americans from the traditional American dream. As the nation entered the 20th Century, Native Americans remained arguably the country’s most oppressed ethnic group. At the same time, the progressive movement swept up the nation. Recent immigrants, African-Americans, Native Americans, and other marginalized minorities sought to improve their social standing and earn complete citizenship with the broad progressive movement. In order for Native Americans to have a political impact, however, they first had to settle internal disputes and create the image of a unified front. Pan-native organizations sprung up during the period, most notably the Red Progressives. Native American activists were split between those who favored assimilation and those that favored dual-identity. The assimilation proposal called for Native Americans to attempt to blend in with the predominantly white culture that surrounded them. On the other hand, those in favor of dual-identity proposed that Native Americans retained their cultural heritage and sought legal and political assimilation. However, once the Red Progressive movement began to fracture politically, the front had to re-unify itself through other means. The pan-native organizations created during the early 20th Century ultimately created an independent spirit amongst the Native American community, and they shifted Native American goals from assimilation to dual-identity.

Assimilation of Native Americans into the “traditional” American society was the primary objective of native and white leaders in the final decades of the 19th Century. Lieutenant Richard Henry Pratt, a white officer with the 19th Infantry Regiment, recalled a conversation between his commanding officer and tribal leaders of the Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, and Apache nations. At the meeting, Pratt’s commander expressed “that the Government was anxious to have the Indians adopt our ways of living and unite with us to use and develop the land of our great and good country,” and the “leading chiefs of the several tribes accepted these sentiments, claiming it was their desire to become like the whites.”

committed to assimilation, Pratt believed that education was the best method to bring Native Americans into the societal norm. He tested his theory at Fort Marion in St. Augustine, Florida. Here he brought “sixty-five representatives of the Cheyenne, Kiowa, Comanche and Arapahoe tribes, who, having been selected as among the worst specimens of the wild, cruel Indians of the far west, have, through the influence of judicious discipline and Christian kindness, become industrious...and, in some instances, unmistakable Christian converts.”

Encouraged by his “successes” at Marion, Pratt opened another school in Carlisle, Pennsylvania and wrote to General William B. Hazen, military advisor to President James A. Garfield, outlining his plan “to create an educational department for the Indian service...and to provide [the department head] with all the means necessary for the work.” Additionally, Pratt convinced Native American leaders that education at Carlisle was in their best interest for assimilation. After a meeting between Pratt and the Lakota chief, Spotted Tail, the leader chose to send five of his twelve children to Carlisle with Pratt.

Assimilation through education remained the approved solution for dealing with Native Americans during the early years of the progressive era. Francis E. Leupp, the commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs from 1904-1909, increased emphasis on schools such as Pratt’s in Carlisle and sought to make the boarding school experience “transformative.” However, tension existed between Leupp and Pratt over President Theodore Roosevelt’s concurrent policies which confined many Native Americans on reservations. Pratt attacked Leupp’s organization for “completely bribing the Indians to remain segregated tribally and racially under Bureau control.” Following the disagreement between the two men, Pratt was forced to resign from his position. Pratt’s removal deeply angered tribal leaders, such as Carlos Montezuma from the Yavapai-Apache tribe, who believed that Pratt’s removal signaled the end of Native American integration. Montezuma wrote Roosevelt that “there is not a wigwam through [sic] the country can smoke a pipe of peace with you for such an act of injustice to our veteran leader.” Roosevelt’s failure to reinstate Pratt led Native American leaders to seek a route for assimilation outside of the Roosevelt administration.

Native American leaders quickly realized that their lobbying efforts would have to present a broad front, as opposed to individual tribes, if they were to gain political traction. Consequently, a pan-native movement would

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2 Ibid., 181.
3 Ibid., 246.
4 Ibid., 224.
be a necessary pre-requisite for the advancement of Native Americans during the progressive era. The greatest challenge to the formation of a pan-native movement was the geographical separation of the United States’ multiple tribes. The Carlisle school, however, provided one central location where multiple tribes were located in a central location. Not surprisingly, it was the well-connected graduates of Carlisle who would return to their tribes and preach the importance of pan-nativism.8

Native American leaders did not believe that the political atmosphere was immediately ready for a larger pan-native movement.9 In 1912, however, the Society of American Indians (later known as the “Red Progressives”) met for the first time with the hope that “the entire race may be given the freedom which will enable it to develop normally as an American people in America.”10 Of the eighteen members present, eleven had roots to eastern boarding schools (eight from Carlisle) and all major geographic regions were represented.11 These members, deeply influenced by Pratt, continued to push for assimilation as the ultimate goal of Native Americans. Education remained the cornerstone of assimilation plans for the Red Progressives. In 1914, Henry Knocksofftwo, a Sioux educated at Carlisle, re-emphasized “that it is better for [Native Americans] to be taken away from the reservation, at least for a time, to attend the government schools provided.”12 Montezuma furthered Knocksofftwo’s argument and wrote to members of the Red Progressives that “the highest purpose of all Indian schools ought to be only to prepare the young Indian to enter the public and other schools of the country.”13

The next step for the Red Progressives was to secure legislation or other government assurance for the further assimilation of Native Americans into American society. At the fourth annual conference of the Society of American Indians, held during October 1914 at the University of Wisconsin, the Red Progressives called in their platform to “petition…the President and Congress of the United States and to the Bureau of Indian affairs with regard to the need of a careful revision and codification of Indian law and the definition of Indian status.”14 The Red Progressives elected one of their own

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9 Ibid., 31.
into federal office in order to propose legislation friendly to their cause. Charles Carter, a member of the Chickasaw tribe from Oklahoma, proposed the Carter Code Bill, which would legally define the citizenship status of Native Americans. Charles Carter, a member of the Chickasaw tribe from Oklahoma, proposed the Carter Code Bill, which would legally define the citizenship status of Native Americans. The bill was defeated, however, not by conservative whites in Congress, but by radicals from within the Red Progressives. Members such as Montezuma were not satisfied with any measure short of immediate citizenship for Native Americans. The Red Progressives had still not created a united front that could enact effective change.

The rift between moderates and radicals among the Red Progressives continued to grow as the nation entered World War I. The advent of World War I diverted the nation’s attention away from domestic reform issues and towards military preparedness and the nation’s role in the world. This period gave the pan-native movement the opportunity to re-calibrate. At home, the Red Progressives sought to make gains while the public could appreciate Native American sacrifice. Abroad, Native Americans in the military made strides towards assimilation that the Red Progressives could not achieve at home. However, the new generation of Native Americans serving abroad was disillusioned by the complete assimilation that the Red Progressives advocated.

On the homefront during World War I, traditional Red Progressive leaders continued their push for reform. In the radical newsletter, Wassaja (Apache for “signaling” and Montezuma’s native name), Montezuma wrote to his audience that “the best time to get your money from a patient is when he is very sick. If you present your bill after he gets well, he will tell you ‘to go to the place where it does not snow.’” He claimed that Native Americans stood their best chance of achieving political success while the American public was directly aware of the sacrifices being made by Native American service members. If Native American activists waited until after the war, the United States government would not express its full gratitude because the war was already won. Montezuma’s audience included Native Americans across the nation and created pan-native identity as one group of people oppressed by the government rather than multiple individual tribes. Those who had not gone off to fight were beginning to become disillusioned about full assimilation as they saw their loved one go fight for a nation which did not provide full citizenship to Native Americans.

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16 Ibid., 111.
Approximately twenty-five percent of all Native American adult males served in the war. These service members did not serve in completely segregated units like their African-American counterparts. However, they generally served in units with many other Native Americans. The government chose to not segregate Native American units “because of the desire to have them rub elbows with fellow citizens and become better acquainted.” The more important consequence though was not the whites that Native Americans met, but the other Native Americans they met. Outside of those who attending government boarding schools, World War I was the first opportunity many Native Americans had to meet individuals outside of their tribe. When the new generation of Native Americans returned from the war, they met at clubs such as the American Legion in order to bond over their similar service and similar heritage. A new form of pan-nativism began to expand. When thousands of Native Americans returned from the war they were proud of their service as both an American and a Native American.

Following the war, and President Woodrow Wilson’s departure from office, Native American leaders continued to push their political agenda for complete citizenship. However, the post-war effort emphasized a legal assimilation into white America but not a similar cultural assimilation. Native Americans were largely inspired by Wilson’s idea of self-determination. Consequently, Native Americans across the nation became less motivated by the American melting-pot and aimed to be part of American pluralism. The Red Progressives (still heavily influenced by Pratt) lost support amongst their Native American counterparts. Even the radical Montezuma had a change of heart. In 1923, the outspoken supporter of assimilation chose to return to his tribe’s reservation in Arizona. He died on January 31, 1923 in a traditional hut as a Native American, not an assimilated member of American society. Montezuma’s obituary did not state that he had spent his life for the assimilation of Native Americans. Instead, it recognized that he was “an advocate of the freedom of American Indians.” Additionally, the obituary emphasized in particular that he “was a full blooded Mojave Apache Indian of the McDowell band.”

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20 Ibid., 74.
21 “Indians in War Are Proving Title as Real American,” *Pueblo Chieftain*, July 4, 1918, 4.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 197.
27 Ibid.
Despite changing cultural attitudes amongst Native Americans, they still sought legal assimilation in the form of citizenship. According to John Collier, the executive secretary of the newly founded American Indian Defense Association, citizenship would grant Native Americans “the elementary rights guaranteed to other Americans by the Constitution” such as the “right to speak freely, to practice one’s own religion, to form associations, to communicate with one’s friends and to move freely about the country.”

After extensive lobbying by pan-native groups such as the American Indian Defense Association, Native Americans finally received the citizenship they desired. The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 stated “that all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States.”

Native American lobbyists, however, sought assurance from the government that they could still maintain their traditions and life on reservations. Therefore, the law included a provision “that the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property.”

Native Americans gained the legal recognition they sought; however, in their final push for citizenship they also recognized that they desired a degree of autonomy and did not want complete assimilation like their predecessors in the first two decades of the 20th Century.

As the United States entered the 20th Century, Native American leadership embraced the idea of the American melting-pot and sought full assimilation of Native Americans into society. In order to gain political support, however, these leaders recognized the importance of a pan-native movement to create broad lobbying support. Increased pan-native connections combined with pride in their service in World War I, however, made Native Americans recognize the importance of their heritage and question the principles of full assimilation. As a result, Native Americans rejected the idea of the American melting pot and embraced pluralism in American society. By 1924, Native Americans had largely dropped their ambitions to assimilate into white society. Rather than assimilate, they sought a new dual-identity. They were culturally Native American but legally American.

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30 Ibid.
Fate Saw the Jewel: Enver Pasha’s Post-War Intrigues, 1918-1922

Ben Tannenbaum

Ben Tannenbaum is a senior studying history at Northwestern University.

In the late Ottoman world, few characters had more personal dynamism than Enver Paşa. Born humbly as Ismail Enver in Constantinople in 1881, Enver advanced through the ranks of the Ottoman military. He helped lead the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in its 1908 Revolution, reaching the heights of power in the Sublime Porte. Enver then went to Libya, fighting Italian troops in the desert heat. Enver rose to Minister of War in 1913. Throughout his meteoric rise to power, Enver displayed a colorful personality. The American ambassador in Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau, noted his “audacity” and believed it was Enver’s most notable trait.1 However, Enver also had a less appealing side. Most prominently, Enver served as the driving force promoting Ottoman involvement in the Great War. Enver personally “had taken the initiative in proposing, negotiating, and executing a secret treaty of alliance with Germany.”2 Enver’s collaboration with German officials - for example, he allowed the German ships Goeben and Breslau into Constantinople without permission of the Grand Vizier - ultimately led Turkey into the Kaiser’s arms.3 He also played a leading role in initiating the genocide of Armenians during the war. Enver’s rule “had a remorselessness, a lack of pity, [and] a cold-blooded determination.”4 Enver added more than a touch of egotism to these traits. For example, in his home Enver displayed portraits of his three favorite generals: Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, and himself.5 Even after the Ottoman defeat, Enver did not abandon his thirst for power and excitement.

An in depth analysis of Enver’s post-war activity yields provides insights into the era’s politics. First, his intrigues fundamentally affected interwar relations between the Soviet Union and the British Empire. Collaborating with the nascent Soviet government, Enver plotted to lead an Islamic uprising to conquer India. Secondly, Enver played an important role in the development of the modern Turkish state, even attempting to overthrow Mustafa Kemal and take power for himself. Therefore, Enver’s plots also help us better understand the formation of the modern Turkish state. Although his threat appeared legitimate, Enver ultimately failed due to a lack of tangible

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3 Ibid., 63.
5 Ibid.
foreign support, the weaknesses of Pan-Islam, and Kemal’s skillful counter-
intrigues.

“The Second Phase”
As the First World War concluded, Enver Paşa managed to create an
apparently potent danger to the interests of the British Empire and to
Nationalists within Turkey. Initially, however, Enver found himself in an
unenviable position after the armistice. His government had reached an “acute
crisis” during the war’s final days.6 As the Ottoman military retreated
headlong through the Levant, Enver and his ruling clique resigned from office.
Enver’s political and even physical survival stood at risk. Many Ottoman
officials found themselves on trial in the months following the war.
Contemporary analysts felt that such indictments “foreshadow[ed] the death
penalty against . . . Enver.”7 Fallen from the heights of power, Enver now
faced a battle for his life.

Soon enough, the charges came against Enver. In July 1919, a
Turkish court martial “condemned to death” Enver and his colleagues.8
Triumphant western analysts trumpeted these charges as fitting retribution for
Enver’s complicity in “joining the war and for Armenian, Greek, and Syrian
atrocities and deportations.”9 Enver’s resume had won him few friends among
the victorious Entente. Further, the court martial charges demonstrated that the
new Turkish military had joined the hostility towards Enver.

However, Enver’s grandiose ambitions did not die with the Ottoman
cause, and he had taken measures to solidify his post-war position. Following
the war, he had no official military or political office. Yet whatever his future
held, Enver knew that he would need money. He reportedly managed to steal
$110 million worth of government funds during the war’s waning days,
sneaking cash out of Swiss bank accounts.10 In fact, Enver had astutely begun
building up a personal “war hoard” as early as 1916.11 He and his cronies had
assiduously “stockpiled bread, groceries, cloth, and other comforts free of
charge.”12 In fairness, these pro-Entente accounts may have grown
exaggerated in the retelling, eager to portray Enver in the most negative light.
Nevertheless, Enver had certainly built a formidable fortune for the post-war
world.

6 “Turkish Crisis,” *Times of London*, October 10, 1918.
9 Ibid.
10 “Money Stolen by Enver Put at $110,000,000,” *New York Times*, December 2, 1918.
   In today’s dollars, this sum would equal $1,724,568,887. By comparison, that ranks
   higher than the GDP of nearly twenty countries, roughly comparable to that of Belize
   and Central African Republic. (Sources: U.S. Dept. of Labor, World Bank.)
12 Ibid.
Finances secured, Enver then addressed the question of his personal safety. In November 1918, even before the official court martial, Enver certainly understood that he could not remain in occupied Constantinople. He would need to leave stealthily and without detection, and he managed to succeed. To this day, it remains unclear exactly when Enver made his escape. The details that we do know, however, certainly enhance Enver’s reputation as a dramatic adventurer. Sometime in early November, he arranged a late night rendezvous on the Bosphorus with his former CUP associates. Whistling in the dark, Enver put on an air of confidence for his defeated comrades. He had recently boasted that the Ottoman setbacks merely represented “the second phase of the war.” Enver maintained a similar bravado this evening and made his getaway in style. As the defeated politicians stood hidden by the dock, a German submarine, _U-67_, emerged from the depths. The sub sailed through the Bosphorus and into the wide expanses of the Black Sea, dropping Enver off on the northern coast. Shrouded in mystery, it took nearly two weeks for reports to emerge that Enver had found refuge in Berlin. Western analysts expressed “regret” that Enver had escaped a victor’s justice. However, Enver now gained a foothold and could begin plotting his next move.

**Enver, Lenin, and Kemal**

Once in Berlin, Enver began searching for a Great Power to assist his intrigues. Implausibly, he first placed his hopes upon the British. Enver received a chilly reception from Whitehall. W.S. Edmonds, a Foreign Office staffer, summed up the British position by refusing to “stoop to treating with a man whom we regard as a criminal.” Enver opportunistically shifted his attentions towards the Soviet Union. Soon he successfully “coquetted for [his] own political ends with the Moscow government.” Karl Radek of the Communist International helped to boost Enver’s standing with Soviet policy.

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13 Yamauchi and Yilmaz each suggest that Enver left on November 2, whereas Sonyel pegs the departure for the 8th. The exact day does not appear overly crucial. Yet the discrepancy makes clear that Enver managed to leave in complete mystery. Western newspapers carry no account of the escape, reiterating his secrecy.


18 Ibid.


makers. Although Radek felt that Enver “had completely lost his [mental] balance,” the two men shared common goals. They coolly sought to foment a pan-Islamic uprising that, with Soviet assistance, would strike against the British Empire.

Enver’s Russian intrigues became quite worrisome for the British. Mere rumors of the plot led to “increasing obstruction” among Muslim subjects in British domains. The challenge appeared quite threatening. Some British analysts projected that “the Lenin-Enver combination . . . stands a considerable chance of success.” Such reports make clear that Enver appeared quite dangerous. At the time, Enver’s plot appeared quite serious.

In order to coordinate with his new partner, Enver sought to personally visit Russia. However, embarking on a trip would prove difficult. He took off from Berlin in spring 1919 embarking on a star-crossed itinerary that included four different plane crashes. It took “a miraculous escape” for Enver to emerge from the wreckages. After one crash, Enver’s disguise drew suspicion and he spent some time in a Lithuanian prison under espionage charges. Nothing if not determined, Enver remained committed to reaching Moscow. After his fourth flight made an emergency landing in Latvia, he passed himself off as a “German Jewish Communist of no importance.” Having evaded another imprisonment, Enver - or Herr Altman as his alias styled himself - finally reached Moscow in the summer of 1920.

During Enver’s odyssey to Russia, the outside world knew little of his whereabouts, creating a mystique of mystery that lent credibility to his threat. Western headlines erroneously announced that Enver had won a crown as the “King of Kurdistan.” Other reports placed Enver in “Daghestan and Transcaucasia.” Meanwhile, former CUP agents busied themselves “distributing a circular alleging that Enver Pasha is now in India marching on Bombay.” While this report appears too outlandish even for Enver, such news gained credence among many Turks. The prevalence of Enver rumors during this time lent an additional aura of mystery to his plotting. Further, the false reports underscore the fear with which Western officials regarded Enver. Enver appeared as a dangerous threat capable of striking anywhere at any time.

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22 “Enver’s ‘Bolshevist Army.’”
23 “New Menace to Armenia,” Times of London, August 5, 1919.
25 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 481.
26 Ibid., 481. Direct quote from Enver.
30 Ibid.
In Moscow, Enver became enmeshed in a tangled diplomatic game involving himself, the Bolsheviks, and the Turkish Nationalists. He ostensibly remained committed to creating “uprisings in the Mohammedan world coincident with a Bolshevist thrust on Persia and India.” Such uprisings would weaken the British Empire. The Soviets stood to gain by supporting Enver. Lenin hoped to “exploit [Enver’s] alleged popularity among the Muslims” against the British. The perception that Enver could serve as a champion of Islam made him a valuable ally. Meanwhile Enver fostered his own agenda. On the surface, he maintained an impression of comity between himself and the Turkish Nationalists by supporting the Turkish-Russian treaty of friendship. Yet Enver’s primary focus remained opposition to Kemal and the Nationalists. He hoped that the Soviets would eventually abandon Kemal and “support Enver’s bid to assume the leadership of the Turkish rebellion.” In order to advance this conflict against Kemal, Enver needed tangible Russian aid. However, he struggled to earn such support. Enver requested Russian guns and arms. He planned to fully ingratiate himself with his Bolshevik patrons by displaying his ideological purity at the Communist International’s Congress of the Peoples of the East, which met in Baku. Yet Enver’s appearance in Baku during the hot and dry September of 1920 presented numerous risks. First, he sacrificed his anonymity. The publicity generated by the Baku convention spread worldwide, and Enver’s whereabouts became public knowledge. Further, many Communist delegates resented Enver’s wartime alliance with Germany and his actions against Armenians. Pro-Kemal delegates represented another obstacle to Enver at Baku. Enver would have a difficult time convincing the convention of his Communist credentials.

In fact, the Soviets limited their support for Enver because he had very little ideological affinity for Bolshevism. When he held power, Enver had never stood as a “champion for . . . the formative proletariat.” Yet he needed to boost his Bolshevik bona fides at Baku in order to win Soviet support against Kemal. Even if Enver did not qualify as a die-hard Marxist, he wanted Russia to believe that “he was much more leftist and progressive than the Mustafa Kemal administration.” At Baku, Enver’s key goal remained gaining assistance against Kemal.

In his speech to the convention, Enver unsuccessfully tried to portray himself as a legitimate Communist. Due to the opposition, Enver could not

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33 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, pg. 482.
34 Ibid., 482.
35 Ibid., 482. Letter written by Enver.
36 “Enver at Baku,” Times of London, September 18, 1920
37 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 482.
39 Ibid., 34.
personally address the crowd. He instead had to rely on a Comrade Ostrovsky to deliver the remarks. Enver punctuated the speech with Communist catchphrases. He railed against “imperialism” and began nearly every paragraph with an appeal to his “comrades.” He also included other Soviet taglines, professing to advocate the interests of “working people,” “conscious people,” “labour,” and “the alliance of the oppressed.” Enver’s heavy use of Communist phraseology reveals his intense desire to win Russian backing. Straight-faced, Enver referred to Lenin and his regime as “the natural ally of all oppressed.” Overall, Enver’s address dripped with obsequiousness. He sought to create a persona as a Communist ideologue. However, as we have seen, Bolshevik ideals meant very little to Enver. Opposition to Kemal stood as the only reason Enver travelled to Baku preaching Communism. Yet the unconvinced delegates heaped boos upon Ostrovsky’s delivery. Substantive Soviet support against Kemal did not appear forthcoming.

At the same time, Enver’s attempts to foment a pan-Islamic rebellion also came up short. In late 1920 and early 1921, he increased his activity towards a Muslim uprising by establishing a “Pan-Islamic Committee.” Enver sought to incorporate Muslims in British-dominated countries such as Egypt and India. His recruitment efforts also took him to less likely locations such as Rome and Switzerland. Ultimately, the committee expanded into a full-fledged League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies. Enver’s organization gained prominent supporters such as his former CUP colleague Talat Paşa. Religion played a featured role in Enver’s ideology. He professed to strive for the “incite[ment] of the Muslims to struggle against the European beasts which trample upon Islam.” While Enver did not practice Islam observantly, the use of religious rhetoric would help gain members. Enver’s use of religion contrasted sharply with Kemal’s staunch secularism. Recruitment for the League went well, and Enver seemingly held full command of a powerful organization.

In reality, Enver’s League had very little clout. First of all, Enver could hardly control his own coalition. It quickly became clear that “no close ties among [the League’s] center and branches existed.” Enver also came
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into conflict with the Arab members of the organization. He impolitically offered higher salaries to Turkish members than their Arab colleagues. Eventually, these tensions came to the surface and “the Arab comrades decided to withdraw from the organization.”\(^48\) Ethnic tensions and a lack of unity derailed Enver’s pretensions of heading a pan-Islamic movement.

In fact, even Enver recognized the slim odds of a mass Muslim uprising. It appears that Enver prioritized his rivalry with Kemal over the success of the Islamic League. By spring of 1921, the League had become only “a dummy for retrieving his lost position [in Turkey] which Mustafa Kemal had usurped.”\(^49\) Within the context of his anti-Kemal intrigues, the salary discrepancies among League members begin to make more sense. Enver rewarded Turkish members of the League because they could help him against Kemal more than the Arab members could. Enver did not really plan to dismember the British Empire. He wanted to defeat Kemal and regain power in Turkey.

Enver’s anti-Nationalist plot reached into Anatolia and appeared to present a substantive danger. Throughout 1920 and 1921 he developed a powerbase by infiltrating pro-Kemal leagues and army garrisons within Turkey.\(^50\) Similarly, Enver founded sympathetic “paramilitary organizations and . . . a semi-underground organization.”\(^51\) More symbolically, Enver’s uncle Halil Paşa managed to enter Turkey so as to “act as a herald of Enver’s entrance into eastern Anatolia.”\(^52\) Enver’s supporters hoped to weaken Kemalist authority within Turkey. Such intrigues occurred in secret and foreign media published few accounts of this work. Yet Enver held high hopes for a return. He even “sent for his uniform, decorations, and sword . . . in readiness to enter Anatolia.”\(^53\) Enver hoped that, like his hero Napoleon, he would triumphantly return from exile to take command of his country.

However, Kemal recognized the threat and skillfully worked to abort Enver’s coup attempts. Kemal blocked those who had “former connection with Enver” from entering Turkey.\(^54\) Similarly the National Assembly banned Enver himself from returning, ostensibly in order to preserve “the internal politics and external relations” of the Turkish Republic.\(^55\) The Turkish government could not risk allowing Enverists into the combustible country. Further, the Nationalists sought to “cause discord among the Unionists in exile.”\(^56\) These efforts intended to divide Enver’s comrades. Kemal already

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 45.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., 46.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., 48.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., 50.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 50.
\(^{53}\) Sonyel, “Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922,” 510.
\(^{54}\) “Angora Nationalists Against Enver,” Times of London, June 2, 1921.
\(^{55}\) Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Paşa as an Expatriate,” pg.53.
felt threatened near his center of power. In spring 1921, Western reports attest that he “discovered and suppressed a movement in favor of Enver Pasha” within the government.\(^{57}\) Kemal took Enver’s plot seriously and actively worked to undermine the threat.

It seems clear that some analysts felt that Enver had a chance of unseating Kemal. In August 1920 a British intelligence report claimed that, of the two factions, “the weaker one was that of Kemal . . . [and Enver was] the far more dangerous party,”\(^{58}\) yet this assessment eventually proved inaccurate. Still, it illustrates that Enver looked like a viable threat. As flawed as his plan sounds in retrospect, at the time people viewed Enver’s plot with the utmost gravity.

Additionally, Enver’s prospects brightened in the summer of 1921 Kemal developed a breach with the Soviet government. He “grew sceptical . . . about the possible advantages of an alliance with the Soviet of Moscow.”\(^{59}\) Kemal’s concern had two key but contradictory components. First, he feared that the Russians would dominate Turkey the same way that they had overpowered many Central Asian nations. Alternatively, Kemal worried that the Russians might totally abandon Turkey and join with Western powers in support of Greece.\(^{60}\) Meanwhile the Soviets grew equally frustrated with Kemal. They felt that Kemal wanted “at heart to make a settlement with the allies [America, France, and Great Britain].”\(^{61}\) Due to diplomatic concerns, a chasm developed between the Turkish and Russian governments.

The antagonism between Lenin and Kemal served Enver’s interests. Previously, Enver had had to conduct his anti-Kemal campaign without formal Soviet aid.\(^{62}\) The Kremlin had supported his rebellious plots against Britain, but declined to assist Enver in Turkey. Now, hostile to Kemal, the Soviet government fully embraced Enver. The Russian ambassador at Ankara, M. Natzarenus, openly maneuvered in favor of Enver.\(^{63}\) In July 1921 Enver embarked for Batum, in present day Georgia. He hoped to use Batum as a base for an offensive into Anatolia. The “little Napoleon” appeared ready to return from Elba.\(^{64}\)

\(^{57}\) “Internal Troubles at Angora,” *Times of London*, June 8, 1921.


\(^{59}\) “Internal Troubles at Angora.” Spelling of “sceptical” appeared that way in the document, and is not a typo on my part.

\(^{60}\) Sonyal, “Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922,” 509.


\(^{62}\) Russian glitterati stood in awe of Enver’s lavish hats and sought active assistance for the “social lion of Moscow,” but to no avail (Fromkin, pg. 483).

\(^{63}\) Sonyel, “Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922,” 511.

\(^{64}\) Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story*, 21.
However, Kemal’s political talents enabled him to resolve his breach with the Soviets. Kemal keenly comprehended the danger of a Russian-backed Enver. In order to repair relations, Kemal opened up secret top-level negotiations with Lenin. Turkey assured the Soviets that it would not move closer to the Western powers. Fears removed, Lenin favored re-alliance with Kemal. As a testament of their restored trust in Kemal, Soviet troops “forcibly detained” Enver in order to prevent him from invading Turkey. Russian agents also fostered dissent among Enver’s camp at Batum, leaving their erstwhile client “thoroughly puzzled.” These displays of faith built confidence between Kemal and Lenin. Kemal vividly told Russian officials that “we shall be bound as tightly together as the hydrogen and oxygen of which water is composed.” The renewed Russo-Turkish friendship had doused the flames of Enver’s grand plot.

Kemal’s ascent continued as his military success further undermined Enver. In September 1921, Kemalist troops defeated the Greek army on the banks of Anatolia’s Sankarya River. This victory gave Kemal enhanced prestige within Turkey. Further, the Battle of Sankarya solidified his alliance with the Soviets. Lenin needed to back a winner, and Kemal clearly filled that role. With Kemal on the rise, “Enver Pasha no longer had utility value” for the Russians. In fact, their prior support for Enver had now “become an embarrassment to the Soviet leaders.” Lenin withdrew his support for Enver’s Batum camp. Inside Turkey, Kemal could now arrest any pro-Enver conspirators without fear of backlash. Enver’s hopes of returning to lead Turkey had become unattainable. He now understood that “his ambitious plan had ended in a fiasco.” Enver would never again set foot in his home country.

“The Arrow has Left the Bow”

Despite the setback, Enver still maintained grandiose ambitions. The Russians wanted him out of the picture in Turkey, and sent him off to the hinterlands of Central Asia. Ostensibly, Enver would quell an anti-Soviet uprising among the Muslims of Bokhara. In reality, Lenin merely sought to remove Enver to a remote location where he could do little harm. Enver played

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65 Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 484.
69 Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 484.
72 In 1920, the Soviet Union had created a Communist government in place of the Emirate of Bokhara. A rebel movement known as the Basmachis emerged, opposing the Soviet puppets and supporting the deposed Emir. These events took place in parts of modern Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 486.
the loyal comrade and obeyed orders. He headed towards Bokhara, seemingly destined for obscurity.

However, Enver abandoned the Soviets and quickly joined the rebellion he had planned to suppress. Under the ruse of a proposed hunting expedition, Enver evaded his Bolshevik handlers and reached the rebel camp. This decision appears not wholly unreasonable from Enver’s perspective. The Soviets had not shown any loyalty to Enver in his struggle with Kemal. Further, upon arriving in Bokhara in November 1921, he developed affection for the cause of the Basmachi rebel movement. The beautiful countryside, replete with “fruit trees, melons, grapevines, roses, poppies, and tobacco plants” appealed to Enver’s romantic sensibilities. He betrayed little hesitation or doubt, proudly boasting to his wife that “the die is cast. The arrow has left its bow.” While Enver’s Napoleonic dreams had failed, he could still gain victory on the battlefields of Alexander and Tamerlane. The chance to carve a new kingdom for himself - in the ancestral homeland of the Turkic peoples, no less - looked like a prize worth seeking.

Yet Enver faced high hurdles. He struggled initially to win the support of the Basmachi. These central Asians mistrusted the presumptuous foreigner, even questioning his Islamic credentials. Moved to tears, Enver had to burn a photograph of his wife in order to defend himself against charges of iconography. Further, the rebel movement had serious internal divisions. British intelligence reports distinguished between the “genuine political Basmachis . . . [and] the purely bandit Basmachis.” Different branches of the movement evidently had divergent agendas. Additionally, ethnic tensions caused divisions within the rebel ranks. Turkmens, Uzbeks, and Kirghiz often fought one another, distracting from the anti-Soviet battle. The fractious nature of the Basmachi movement made Enver’s task quite difficult.

Despite the obstacles, he managed to achieve a degree of success. He had popular support, as the Bokharan people typically favored the Basmachis against the Soviet invaders. Enver also benefitted from foreign backing. Afghanistan’s reformist king, Amanullah, sent “money, rifles, and ammunition” to Enver’s cause. At his peak, Enver amassed and led an army of 20,000-30,000 men. This force won some engagements. For example, in early 1922 the Enverian host launched a “daring raid on the city of Bokhara,” a strategic urban center. He also used irregular guerilla tactics in order to

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73 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 486.
76 Ibid., 57. Direct quote from British intelligence report.
77 Yılmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Paşa as an Expatriate,” 59
78 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 56.
79 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 487.
gain some “important towns and villages.” These successes illustrate that Enver’s army had clout and remained a potential - if farfetched - threat to Kemalist Turkey. Enver had gained power and appeared in his element.

Despite his battlefield wins, Enver failed to acquire foreign supporters. The Soviets actually offered an olive branch to Enver, seeking to reach accommodation. Enver responded haughtily and foolishly. He waited a month to reply, and even then refused to treat with those who “[dis]respect the wishes of the Muslim peoples.” However, Enver could not convert his breach with the Soviets into British backing. The Viceroy of India advised London “to steer absolutely clear of Bokhara.” Enver would not gain support of a Great Power.

Enver’s position in Bokhara also began to decline. As the summer of 1922 approached, tensions developed between Enver and the Emir. This conflict erupted for petty personal reasons. Never known for his modesty, Enver styled himself as “Commander in Chief of all the armies of Islam.” Eventually he claimed the title of “Emir of Turkestan.” These needless vanities irritated the actual Emir, Enver’s supposed superior officer. Additionally, Enver had “alienated the other Basmachi leaders” with assorted minor squabbles. Harried at home and friendless abroad, Enver’s position grew precarious.

Enver retreated into the hills of Bokhara for a last stand. The cool mountain air refreshed him after the oppressive lowland July heat. Yet Russian troops harassed Enver’s party. On August 4, the Soviets surrounded him. The untamed Basmachi cavalry could prove no match for disciplined Soviet machine guns. Enver had foreseen the catastrophe. The previous night, the holiday of Eid e-Ghorban or the Feast of Sacrifice, Enver “dreamt that he would die a martyrs death.” Now, he bravely steeled himself for one final charge. Enver sat mounted upon his favorite horse, Dervish.

80 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 56.
82 Ibid. Direct quote from cable sent by Enver.
84 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 487.
85 Ibid., 487.
87 Yılmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Paşa as an Expatriate,” 61. Direct quote from İttihad i İslam (a newspaper in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan), October 1922. This story may have developed or grown embellished after Enver’s death. Even so, it illustrates his use of Islam to gain support. The dramatic nature of the tale sounds like something Enver could have said and adds to his charisma.
the end, his khaki uniform remained clean and immaculate. Finally Enver drew his sabre and rode headlong towards the Russian guns.

**The Legacy of Enver:**

After the battle, many conflicting tales circulated. It took two weeks for reports of Enver’s death to reach the West. Still, many refused to believe that he had perished. He reportedly had formed “a definite alliance” with Kemal. In October, the rumor spread that he had actually defeated the Soviets quite handily. Alternatively, perhaps the crafty Enver had merely feigned his death as “a ruse to cover his disappearance with a view to a fresh adventure elsewhere.” Again the prevalence of wide-ranging Enver rumors illustrates the power that his aura held. Further, the Basmachis strategically sought to perpetuate the belief that Enver could return at any moment in support of their cause. Meanwhile the Russians also spread misinformation. In late October, Soviet mouthpieces such as *The Journal* claimed that Enver still lived but had rejoined the Bolshevik fold. The power of Enver’s name and reputation lived on well after his death.

Since his defeat in the Bokharan hills, Enver has held a complicated place in Turkish memory. Initially, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk felt little need to praise the legacy of his defeated rival. Enver’s involvement in the failures of the First World War further tarnished his allure. Throughout most of the Twentieth Century, Enver’s reputation languished in negativity. Yet the sun shined bright for Enver on August 4, 1996. On that hot, humid summer afternoon, Turkish dignitaries assembled on the green grass of İstanbul’s Hrriyet-i Ebediye Tepesi hill to honor the fallen warrior. The morning’s forecast had called for rain, but by the time of the ceremony only blue skies appeared overhead. Enver received plaudits and admiration at the service. The President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, eulogized Enver as “an honest soldier who loved his country.” Abdullah Gül, a future President, lauded Enver’s martyrdom. Tajikistani peasants flown in for the memorial

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89 “Enver Pasha Reported to be Dead,” *Times of London*, August 19, 1922.
90 “Enver Pasha Slain by Soviet Force” and “Enver Pasha Reported to be Dead.”
91 “Enver Pasha Reported to be Dead.”
93 “Enver’s Reported Death,” *Times of London*, October 30, 1922
98 “Ottoman WW I leader Enver Pasha buried in Istanbul.”
faithfully retold old tales of the “commander’s” Bokharan glory.\textsuperscript{99} The ceremony did not just praise Enver, but buried him as well. As his grandson tearfully looked on, Enver’s “flag-draped coffin” finally returned to Turkish soil.\textsuperscript{100} Enver would reside near familiar faces, as his new tomb stood next to Talat Paşa’s. The old compadres would spend eternity together in the shadow of the Monument of Liberty.\textsuperscript{101} Those who recall Enver’s activities during the First World War - not to mention his braggadocio, defeats, and disloyalty - may dispute such a rosy portrayal of his life. Either way, Enver remains a controversial figure in the modern world. He still holds the power to unite and to divide, to inspire and to appall.

\textsuperscript{99} “Ottoman WW I leader Enver Pasha buried in Istanbul.”
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.