“Strategic Attribution: Target State Communication in Response to Cyber Operations” examines the strategic logic of target states who are victims of clandestine and covert state-sponsored cyber operations. The existing literature narrowly focuses on how attribution challenges erode deterrence by punishment by hindering a timely response. I argue that the attribution problem provides the target state increased agency in deciding when, and to what extent, to communicate cyber operations. This discretion allows states flexibility in their response and provides greater control over escalation and domestic political costs at the expense of deterrence by punishment. Additionally, I argue that target states have two distinct decision points, to reveal and to publicly assign blame, leading to three distinct strategies of communication: collusion, disclosure, and public attribution. 

“Responding to Uncertainty: The Importance of Covertness for Public Support of Retaliation to Cyber and Kinetic Attacks.” Under Review.

This paper investigates the escalation dynamics of cyber attacks. Two main theories have been advanced. First, “means-based” theory argues attack type determines response; cyber attacks are less likely to escalate than kinetic attacks. Second, “effects-based” theory argues an attack’s material consequences determine the likelihood of retaliation. We advance a third perspective, arguing that the covertness of an attack has the largest effect on its propensity towards escalation. We identify two characteristics of covertness that affect support for retaliation: the certainty of attribution and its timing. We use a survey experiment to assess public support for retaliation, while varying the means, effects, timing, and attribution certainty of attacks. We find no evidence for the effects-based approach, instead finding high levels of support for retaliation regardless of an attack's scale. We find that the most significant contributor to support for retaliation is an attack's covertness.

DATASET

“Dyadic Cyber Incident Dataset.” With Ryan Maness, Brandon Valeriano, Ben Jensen and Jose Macias. Available at: https://drryanmaness.wixsite.com/cyberconflict/cyber-conflict-dataset